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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, patents on human genes, software, and business methods have 
stoked a heated public discussion on patent law. Much of that discussion has 
focused on the doctrine of patent eligibility, or patentable subject matter, a 
century-and-a-half old legal doctrine that limits the types of inventions that 
can be patented.
' 
The doctrine currently prohibits patents on "laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas," as well as "products of 
nature."2 Courts and commentators have long viewed these phrases as 
legalistic terms of art. That is, terms that have, or should have, particular 
legal significance apart from a scientific or philosophical exegesis of the 
words themselves.3 But there is good reason to doubt this assumption. Since 
patent eligibility's inception, the Supreme Court has never provided a 
concrete definition or a legal test for what makes a natural "law," 
"phenomenon," or "product." Rather, it has tethered patent eligibility's 
1. See, e.g., Ed Black, Op-Ed., Patent Reform Will Remove the Breaks from Innovation, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 15, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://perma.cc/YFgS-BLQK ("The only real 
solution is to raise the basic standard of what is a patentable invention."); Editorial, Congress, Not 
Courts, Must Fix Flaws in Gene-Patent System, BOSTON.COM (Nov. 21, 2010), http://perma.cc/ 
Q826-Q7QK ("Perhaps the best policy would be to simply do away with [genel patents."); 
Editorial, Patently Ridiculous, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2006), http://perma.cc/GA9R-NTLZ ("The 
definition of what is patentable has slowly evolved to include business practices and broad 
ideas."); Editorial, Reining in Patents, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2010), http://perma.cc/PH9V-EKSQ 
("Underlying many of these disputes is a fundamental question about what patents should 
cover."). 
2. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (lg81) ("Excluded from such patent protection 
are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.s. 
303, 313 (lg80) ("Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between 
living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-
made inventions."). 
3. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARyL. REv. 371 (2005) 
(viewing patentable subject matter as a function of "inherency"); Tun:Jen Chiang, The Rules and 
Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REv. 1353 (dividing patent eligibility into 
easier "rules" and more difficult "standards"); Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, operating 
Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1673 
(2010) (attempting to simplify patent eligibility through decision ordering); Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods 
After In Re Bilski, 3 CAsE W. REs. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET I, 50-64 (2012) (describing patent 
eligibility through three normative functions); John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and 
Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REv. 1041, 1079 (2011) ("[Tlhe real concern seems to be that 
the sCH:alled laws of nature cited by the Supreme Court are 'abstract ideas'-generalized 
descriptions untethered to any particular, practical ends."); Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility: 
Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 519, 551 (2006) ("It appears that 
'law of nature' in patent law can be called a term of art ... ."); Mark A. Lemley et aI., Life After 
Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REv. 1315, 1332-35 (2011) (tying patent eligibility to claim scope); Michael 
Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REv. 591 (2008) (arguing that the other 
requirements for patentability, such as enablement, nonobviousness, and novelty, in total, 
satisfy the doctrine of patent eligibility); Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50 
Hous. L. REv. 563, 56g-86 (2012) (describing and criticizing patent eligibility as a test of 
"preemption") . 
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"natural" terms to a varied list of scientific tropes in an apparent attempt to 
extract a scientific or philosophical meaning from them.4 
This disconnect between how courts and scholars view patent 
eligibility's "natural" terms and how they analogize them to the real world 
has contributed to the doctrine's lack of either consistency or clarity.s 
Virtually no cases or legal scholarship have focused on what these terms 
mean in a scientific or philosophical context-that is, what science considers 
to be a "law of nature," whether a phenomenon is "natural," or when a 
product is "of nature."6 And none have discussed whether these meanings 
have changed since patent eligibility's inception over 150 years ago. This 
Article shows how one branch of scientific philosophy-natural 
complexity-both illuminates and challenges the doctrine of patent 
eligibility and can be harnessed to ultimately simplify it. 
Originally concerned with the ills of overbroad patents, early American 
and British decisions on patent eligibility concerned the prohibition of 
patenting "principles" or "abstractions," as opposed to their concrete 
applications.7 This test, despite its difficulties, was a decidedly legalistic one, 
and the few references to "laws of nature" were simple shorthands for 
"principles."B In 1948, however, the Supreme Court, in Funk Brothers Seed Co. 
4. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 
(2012) (giving, as examples of "laws of nature" or "natural phenomena," "a new mineral 
discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild," the equation E=mc', and "the law of 
gravity" (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lab. Corp. 
of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(listing electromagnetism, steam, "the heat of the sun, electricity, [andl the qualities of metals" 
(quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (citing O'Reilly 
v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 116 (1853)))). 
5. See MySpace, Inc. v. CraphOn Corp., 672 F'3d 1250, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (declaring 
patentable subject matter a "swamp of verbiage" and a "murky morass"); Chiang, supra note 3, 
at 1354-55 ("[Tlhe doctrines on patentable subject matter are difficult to apply."); Risch, supra 
note 3, at 591 (characterizing patent eligibility as the "confused and inconsistent jurisprudence 
of patentable subject matter"); Strandburg, supra note 3, at 566-67 ("The precise reasons for 
[patentable subject matterJ exclusions have been left murky, however, frustrating their 
implementation and often leading to incoherence in courts' reasoning about whether claims 
are too abstract or too 'natural' to be patentable."). 
6. But see, e.g., Golden, supra note 3, at 1079 (proposing that the doctrine only concern 
itself with prohibiting "abstract ideas" as a way of circumventing philosophical concerns 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Kane, supra note 3, at 551 (writing that, despite 
philosophical debates over terms like "laws of nature," "lilt appears that 'law of nature' in 
patent law can be called a term of art"). 
7 . See infra Part I.A. 
8. See Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 726-27 (1880) (quoting O'Reilly v. Morse in 
support of sustaining a patent directed to a process of treating fats and oils); O'Reilly, 56 U.S. 
(15 How.) at 119 ("And it make. no difference, in this respect, whether the effect is produced 
by chemical agency or combination; or by the application of discoveries or principles in natural 
philosophy known or unknown before his invention; or by machinery acting altogether upon 
mechanical principles. In either case he must describe the manner and process as above 
mentioned, and the end it accomplishes."); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 
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v. Kalo Inoculant Co., separately proscribed patents on "laws of nature" or 
"natural phenomena."9 And around the same time, courts also began to 
incorporate patent law's long-standing ban on patenting "products of 
nature" into this reimagined doctrine of patent eligibility.'o 
Since then, the Supreme Court has struggled to give these "natural" 
terms any concrete, legal meaning. ll Unlike its jurisprudence in other areas 
of the law that similarly struggle with vague terms, the Court has devised no 
framework, no factors, and no legal definition to discern them.'" Rather, the 
Court's opinions have continually relied on a list of putative examples of 
natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products," such as electricity, the 
qualities of metals, or wild plants. 's In this way, patent eligibility's "natural" 
terms have shifted from legal descriptions to philosophical or scientific 
concepts. 
(1852) ("A patent will be good, though the subject of the patent consists in the discovery of a 
great, general, and most comprehensive principle in science or law of nature, if that principle is 
by the specification applied to any special purpose, so as thereby to effectuate a practical result 
and benefit not previously attained." (quoting Househill Coal & Iron Co. v. Nielson, (1843) 8 
Eng. Rep. 616 (H.L.); I Web. P.C. 673, 683)). 
9. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130 ("[P)atents cannot issue for the discovery of the 
phenomena of nature .... [T)he heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part 
of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all 
men and reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of 
nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes." (citation omitted)); see also 
Ted Sichelman, Funk Forward, in INTELLEGrUAL PROPER1Y AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED 
CONTOURS OF IP (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=2035027 (discussing the effect of Funk Brothers on 
patent eligibility's "natural" terms). 
10. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (allowing, as 
patent eligible, an "isolated" and "purified" form of adrenaline), affd in part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 
496 (2d Cir. 1912); Christopher Beauchamp, Patenting Nature: A Problem of History, 16 STAN. 
TECH. 1. REv. 257, 300-06 (2013) (tracing the historical .incorporation of the "products of 
nature" doctrine into the doctrine of patent eligibility). 
11. See Chiang, supra note 3, at 1389 ("The label 'laws of nature' is, like the label 'abstract 
idea,' infinitely malleable and thus conclusory."); Sichelman, supra note 9, at 2 (" [T) horny and 
problematic legal issues in today's case law are reflected by the Funk Brothers decision itself. 
Indeed, I argue that the misguided reasoning of the Funk Brothers majority opinion-which 
declared the bacteria mixture ineligible for patenting-continues to plague patentable subject 
matter jurisprudence. "). 
12. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
180-81 (2000) (providing an analytical framework for assessing the existence of a "case or 
controversy" under the Constitution); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1994) 
(defining "deliberate indifference," for purposes of "cruel and unusual" punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment, as "subjective recklessness ... a familiar and workable standard" in 
criminal law); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (articulating 
personal jUrisdiction's requirement of "fair play and substantial justice" as encompassing several 
factors, including "the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the 
plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief'). 
13. See supra note + 
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Unsurprisingly, recent technologies have tested courts' abilities to 
provide coherency to this concept of "nature" in patent eligibility.'4 The 
results, so far, have been less than satisfactory.'5 Some of this difficulty comes 
from the scientific advances since patent eligibility'S inception 150 years ago. 
Spurred by revolutions in the sciences, the past century-and-a-half witnessed 
an explosive increase in the amount and diversity of information about the 
natural world. ,6 Beginning in the 1940s, this increase became the object of 
scientific and philosophical inquiry.'7 Scientists began to take note of "the 
number and variety of [nature's] constituent elements and of the 
elaborateness of their interrelational structure."18 At the same time, 
philosophers began to describe the cognitive difficulties that this increase in 
information posed for reducing nature to simplistic descriptions. '9 "More," 
it turned out, was different.·o This view of information's effect on science 
developed into a theory of "natural complexity."" In particular, scientific 
philosophers realized that natural complexity complicated efforts to 
describe nature with either constancy or causality, attenuated the force of 
certain conclusions derived from StatIStiCS, and caused "emergent 
properties" to appear that could not be construed as fundamental natural 
"laws" or "phenomena."" Simply put, natural complexity made using terms 
like "laws of nature," "natural phenomena," or "products of nature" harder 
to justify and more difficult to define. 
The uncertainties that natural complexity imparts on patent eligibility'S 
"natural" terms therefore explain some of the problems with the current 
14. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 
(2013) (assessing gene patents); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289, 1294 (2012) (assessing the patent eligibility of medical diagnostics). 
15. See Robert R. Sachs, Punishing Prometheus: The Supreme Court's Blunders in Mayo v. 
Prometheus, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 26, 2012, 8:10 AM), http://perma.cc/3LHW-Q\J'3 ("Like so 
many pseudo-sciences in which every phenomenon can be rationalized and in which there is no 
test that can show the theory to be incorrect, under Prometheus seemingly anything can be 
'explained' as being unpatentable subject matter."). 
16. See NICHOLAS RESCHER, COMPLEXIIT: A PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW 75-77 (1998) 
(describing the growth of scientific research, information, spending, and facilities). 
17. See generally Warren Weaver, Science and Complexity, 36 AM. SCIENTIST 536, 538 (1948) 
(discussing the implications for the scientific study of systems "in which the number of variables 
is very large, and one in which each of the many variables has a behavior which is individually 
erratic, or perhaps totally unknown"). 
18. See RESCHER, supra note 16, at I. 
19. See id. at 87 ("[TJhe increasing resource requirement for digging into ever deeper 
layers of complexity is such that successive triumphs in our cognitive struggles with nature are 
only to be gained at an increasingly greater price. The world's inherent complexity renders the 
task of its cognitive penetration increasingly demanding and difficult. The process at issue with 
the growth of scientific knowledge in our complex world is one of drastically diminishing 
returns."). 
20. P.W. Anderson, More Is DifJerent, 177 SCIENCE 393 (197 2). 
2 I. See RESCHER, supra note 16, at 25-54 (discussing natural complexity). 
22. See infra Part II. 
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doctrine. First, patent eligibility struggles to equivalently exclude all claims 
encompassing a natural "law," "phenomena," or "product," even though 
natural complexity demonstrates that such concepts occupy a varied 
spectrum of both scope and depth. Second, without the ability to precisely 
delineate which patent claim elements encompass natural "laws," 
"phenomena," or "products," the Supreme Court has incorrectly 
marginalized the importance of claim language in assessing patent 
eligibility. And third, although patent law prides itself on being "technology 
neutral," the uncertainties facing patent eligibility's "natural" terms give 
their application an unwanted technology-specific effect. 2 3 
These difficulties suggest that patent eligibility's "natural" terms should 
be abandoned. In their place, courts should rely on a descriptive legal 
framework to assess patent eligibility. Constructing such a framework proves 
difficult, however, because patent eligibility has itself become complex: the 
doctrine must now contend with more, and more varied, precedent, patents, 
and technologies than ever before. 2 4 In the sciences, descriptive frameworks 
to naturally complex systems are often created through the twin strategies of 
"decomposition," breaking down a system into cognitively simple subparts, 
and "localization," the mapping of each of those subparts to the goals or 
purpose of the system.25 This occurs in the law as well, through the use of 
"multiprong" or "multifactor" analyses.26 For patent eligibility, a cognitively 
simple yet robust analysis could be developed by breaking down the 
component parts of a typical patent-the claims and the specification-and 
by mapping these components to the policy goals of patent eligibility. This, 
or a similar analysis, would bring much-needed clarity to patent eligibility 
despite the complexities of both science and the law. 
23. See infra Part III. 
24. See generallyJohn R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States 
Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REv. 77 (2002) (examining the recent increase in the complexity of the 
patent system). 
25. See generally WILLIAM BECHTEL & ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, DISCOVERING COMPLEXI1Y: 
DECOMPOSITION AND LOCALIZATION AS STRATEGIES IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH xxviii-xxxvii (MIT 
Press ed. 2010) (2000) (describing decomposition and localization in scientific practice). 
26. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
180-81 (2000) (providing a multiprong analysis for standing); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (articulating a set of factors to assess personal 
jurisdiction); Lemley et aI., supra note 3, at 1341 (proposing five factors to identify "abstract 
ideas" in patent eligibility); Sichelman, supra note g, at 15-17 (applying a similar set of factors 
to rectify Mayo and Myriall); see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, g8 YALE LJ. 
221, 2go-g1 (lg88) ("The solution [to the generality problem in standing is] to break down 
what might appear to be a single, general question into discrete and particular questions. In 
seeking to determine whether a particular plaintiff has standing, we should ask, as a question of 
law on the merits, whether the plaintiff has the right to enforce the particular legal duty in 
question. Standing, if seen in this fashion, is a question of substantive law, and the answers to 
standing questions will vary as the substantive law varies. "). 
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This Article recounts the development of patent eligibility's "natural" 
terms, explains how natural complexity complicates this terminology and 
patent eligibility, generally, and proposes a method to solve these problems. 
Part I traces the doctrine of patent eligibility from its inception as a rule 
against patenting "principles" to today's prohibition on patenting "laws of 
nature," "natural phenomena," and "products of nature." Part II discusses 
how natural complexity imparts cognitive difficulties in developing and 
defining patent eligibility'S "natural" terms. And Part III explains these 
difficulties' roles in some of the problems present in today's patent eligibility 
determinations. Part IV attempts to solve these difficulties: it posits that 
patent eligibility has itself become complex, and builds on the complexity 
literature to propose a solution; it describes how science employs the 
strategies of decomposition and localization to describe complex systems; 
and it uses this framework to develop a similar test for patent eligibility. 
1. THE LAw AND SCIENCE OF PATENT ELlGIBILllY 
The Constitution authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries,"27 
i.e., to grant patents.28 Since 1790, Congress has exercised this authority by 
statute and "fixed the conditions upon which patents and copyrights shall be 
granted."29 The subject matter eligible for patenting is now codified in § 101 
of the patent statute: "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."30 This 
liberal definition of "Writings and Discoveries" has changed little in over 
200 years,3 1 and "embodie[s the] philosophy that 'ingenuity should receive a 
liberal encouragement. "'3 2 
Yet liberality is not limitless. Section 101, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, has long excluded various forms of inventions from patent eligibility. 
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8. 
28. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1964) ("Pursuant to this 
constitutional authority, Congress in 1790 enacted the first federal patent and copyright law, 
and ever since that time has fixed the conditions upon which patents and copyrights shall be 
granted." (citations omitted)). 
29. [d. 
30. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
31. Compare Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § I, I Stat. 109, 109-12 (repealed 1793) (allowing 
patents for "any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement 
therein"), with Patent Act of 1793, ch. II, § I, I Stat. 318, 318-23 (repealed 1836) (allowing 
patents for "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter"), and 
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (repealed 1952) (same), and Patent Act of 1952, 
ch. 950, § 101, 66 Stat. 792 (changing "art" to "process" to read "any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter") , and 35 U.S.C. § 101 (same). 
32. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 75-76 (Washington ed. 1871)). 
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Such efforts began humbly, as attempts to avoid the ills of patent 
applications on "principles" or "abstractions," rather than inventions.33 The 
modem doctrine, however, has since grown wildly. Today, in addition to 
"abstract ideas," the doctrine of patent eligibility also excludes "laws of 
nature," "natural phenomena," and "products of nature."34 This has been a 
change in kind as well as degree. While the bar struggled to determine what 
precisely constituted a "principle" or an "abstraction," its difficulties were 
legalistic ones.35 The difficulties inherent in defining "laws of nature," 
"natural phenomena," and "products of nature," however, have had a 
decidedly scientific or philosophical feel. Indeed, rather than articulating 
any precise factors to determine what constitutes natural "laws," 
"phenomena," or "products," the Court has tethered those terms to 
scientific rather than legal concepts.36 Understanding patent eligibility's 
"natural" terms, therefore, requires a historical understanding of the 
doctrine as a fundamental shift from law to scientific philosophy. 
33. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 116 (1853) ("[TJhe discovery of a 
principle in natural philosophy or physical science, is not patentable."); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 
U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852) ("A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an 
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an 
exclusive right."). 
34· Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (lg81) ("Excluded from such patent protection 
are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313 
("Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate 
things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions."). 
35. See GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL 
INVENTIONS: As ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at xxviii-xxix 
(The Lawbook Exch., Ltd., 4th ed. 2005) (1873) ("When it has been laid down that a 
'principle,'-meaning by this use of the term a law of nature, or a general property of matter, 
or rule of abstract science,---<:annot be the subject of a patent, the doctrine, rightly understood, 
asserts only that a law, property, or rule cannot, in the abstract, be appropriated by any 
man ... unless the variation of means, apparatus, method, form, or arrangement of matter 
introduces some new law, or creates some new characteristic, which produces or constitutes a 
substantially different result."); S.H.H., Patenting a Principle, 16 AM. L. REG. 12g, 129-30 (1868) 
("The opinions of professional men are far from being settled, apparently, upon all the 
questions involved in patenting a principle.... Several things have contributed to this 
discordance of sentiment. One of the most prominent is a misapprehension of the effect and 
bearing of some of the cases on the subject."). 
36. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 128g, 12g3 (2012) 
("[TJhe Court has written that a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in 
the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law 
that E=mc'; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity." (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
at 309) (internal quotation marks omitted»; Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 
Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006) (Breyer, j., dissenting) ("Neither can one patent 'a novel 
and useful mathematical formula,' the motive power of electromagnetism or steam, 'the heat of 
the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals.'" (citations omitted»; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185 
(quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309). 
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A. THE EARLY RUlE AGAINST PATENTING ''PRINCIPLES'' 
In 1790, Congress modeled the first patent statute in the U.S. after the 
British Statute of Monopolies.37 More expansive than the British Statute, 
which allowed only "manufactures" to be patented,38 the Patent Act of 1790 
granted an inventor a monopoly for "any useful art, manufacture, engine, 
machine, or device."39 Congress updated this language slightly in 1793 to 
include "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of 
matter,"40 and has left it virtually unchanged since.4 1 
Early American courts heartily adopted the British maxim that patents 
"for a principle or function detached from machinery" were void.42 In Wyeth 
v. Stone, Justice Joseph Story-"one of the architects of American patent 
law"43-invalidated a patent for an automated method "to cut ice of a 
uniform size," concluding that" [s]uch a claim [was] utterly unmaintainable 
in point of law," because "[i] t is a claim for an art or principle in the 
abstract, and not for any particular method or machinery."44 Denying 
eligibility to the asserted patent prevented monopolizing "a right to cut ice 
by all means or methods, or by all or any sort of apparatus, although he is 
not the inventor of any or all of such means, methods, or apparatus."45 
Justice Story similarly struck down a patent for a method "of communication 
of motion from the reed to the yarn beam" in a 100m.46 That patent, too, was 
"utterly void, as being an attempt to maintain a patent for an abstract 
principle, or for all possible and probable modes whatsoever of such 
communication, although they may be invented by others, and substantially 
differ from the mode described by the plaintiff in his specification."47 And in 
Smith v. Downing, one of the cases concerning the Morse telegraph, the court 
clarified that "some expressions may have been used by one or two judges, 
which look like a sanction to patenting a principle, yet they are used in the 
above sense, of a principle in operation, in the manner set out in the 
specification." 48 
37. John F. DuffY, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REv. I, 
34-36 (2°°7)· 
38. Statute of Monopolies, 1623,21 Jac., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.) (allowing patents for only the 
"working or makinge of any manner of new Manufactures within this Realme, to the true and 
first Inventor and Inventors of such Manufactures"). 
39. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § I, I Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793)· 
40. Patent Act of 1793, ch. II, § I, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (repealed IS36). 
41. See supra note 31. 
42. Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648,65° (C.C.D. Mass. IS39) (No. 15IS). 
43. Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American Patent Law, 5 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 254, 254 (1961). 
44. Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. IS40) (No. IS,107). 
45. [d. 
46. Stone v. Sprague, 23 F. Cas. 161, 162 (C.C.D.R.1. IS40) (No. 13,487). 
[d. 
Smith v. Downing, 22 F. Cas. 511,514 (C.C.D. Mass. 1850) (No. 13,°36). 
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In 1852, in Le Roy v. Tatham, the Supreme Court accepted the analysis 
that a "principle," alone, could not be patented.49 The Court assessed a 
process patent concerning the manufacture of metal pipes under 
continuous heat and pressure.50 The patent claimed the manufacturing 
process "in the manner set forth [in the patent], or in any other manner 
substantially the same."s· Although the case did not discuss whether it was 
the subject of a patent, the Court nonetheless concurred that "a principle is 
not patentable."52 But it also recognized that "[t]he word principle is 
used ... with such a want of precision in its application, as to mislead,"53 and 
attempted to define the term as "a fundamental truth; an original cause; a 
motive."S4 "[T]hese," the Court concluded, "cannot be patented, as no one 
can claim in either of them an exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive right 
exist to a new power, should one be discovered in addition to those already 
known."55 Nonetheless, the Court agreed that: 
[a] patent will be good, though the subject of the patent consists in 
the discovery of a great, general, and most comprehensive 
principle in science or law of nature, if that principle is by the 
specification applied to any special purpose, so as thereby to 
effectuate a practical result and benefit not previously attained.56 
The Court reaffirmed the specific-application reasoning the following 
year in O'Reilly v. Morse, the seminal Morse telegraph case, striking down one 
of Morse's claims for "the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic 
current ... however developed for marking or printing intelligible 
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances."57 The claim did "not confine 
[itself] to the machinery or parts of machinery ... [but] a monopoly in its 
use, however developed, for the purpose of printing at a distance."58 Such a 
monopoly was too broad-it impeded, rather than promoted the 
constitutional directive concerning the "Progress of Science."59 As such, the 
Court invalidated claim 8 of Morse's patent because it prevented "some 
future inventor, in the onward march of science, [from] discover[ing] a 
49. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156,175 (1852). 
50. [d. at 172-73. 
51. 
52. 
53· 
54· 
55· 
[d. at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
[d. at 175. 
[d. at 174. 
[d. at 175. 
[d. 
56. [d. (quoting Househill Coal & Iron Co. v. Nielson, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 616 (H.L.); 
1 Web. P.C. 673, 683) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853). 
58. [d. at 113. 
59. See U.S. CONST. an. I, § 8, cl. 8 (describing Congress's power "[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). 
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mode of writin'g or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic 
current, without using any part of the process or combination set forth in 
the plaintiff's specification."60 
This connection between "principle" and claim scope seemed to also 
extend to compositions of matter, as well as machines and processes. In 
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.,judge Learned Hand famously upheld 
a patent directed to adrenaline.61 Although the chemical was no different 
from how it was found in the adrenal gland, the court concluded that the act 
of isolating and purifying the chemical from its natural surroundings was "a 
purification of the principle, [for] it became for every practical purpose a 
new thing commercially and therapeutically."62 This made "[t]he purpose of 
the claims ... quite clear ... with a corresponding limitation of scope. "63 
Rather than focus on issues of science or philosophy, scholars have 
since described these cases as concerning "overbreadth"-whether the 
patents attempted to claim more than they invented.64 And indeed, 
Supreme Court decisions soon after Le Roy and O'Reilly bear out this logic.65 
Defining "principles" or "abstractions," therefore, was a purely legal exercise 
tied to the scope of patents' claims relative to their disclosure. Reduced to a 
simple syllogism, patent eligibility stood for little more than this: "Applying a 
basic scientific principle to the construction of a useful object is patentable; 
claiming every use of that principle isn't. "66 
B. fuNK BROTHERS SEED CO. V. KALo INOCULANT CO. AND THE RISE OF PATENT 
EUGIBIUTY'S "NATURAL" TERMs 
This uniform view against patenting "principles," however, concealed 
two greater disputes. First, the advances in science in the early twentieth 
century quickly began to erode the assumption that scientific advances 
themselves-apart from physical machinery-should not be patent eligible. 
60, O'Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How,) at 113, 
61. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 18g F. 95, 104 (C.C.S.D.N.V Igll), ajfd in 
part, rev'dinpart, Ig6 F. 496 (2d Cir. IgI2). 
62. [d. at 103. 
63. /d. at 109. 
64. See Lemley et aI., supra note 3, at 1333-35· 
65. E.g., Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 257 (lg28) 
(prohibiting a patentee from "claiming a patent on the result or function of a machine [to] 
extend his patent to devices or mechanisms not described in the patent"); Minerals Separation, 
Ltd. v. Butte & Superior Mining Co., 250 U.S. 336, 349 (lglg) (noting that "the scope of [the 
patentees'] right is limited to the means they have devised and described as constituting the 
process"); Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 581 (18g8) ("[W]hether 
you call Westinghouse's discovery ... a process, or a mode of operation ... if he was the first to 
disclose it and to describe a mechanical means to give practical effect to the invention, he must 
be regarded as a pioneer inventor, and as entitled to protection .... "); Winans v. Denmead, 56 
U.S. (15 How.) 330,341-42 (1853) (patenting "principles" monopolized "any thing which is 
matter of common right, [rather than] what [inventors] themselves have created"). 
66. Lemley et al., supra note 3, at 1334-35. 
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Yet scholars struggled to conceive the contours of a potentially new regime. 
One commentator noted that "practical difficulties .... [lay in the] primary 
importance that the scientific discovery which is to be rewarded be very 
carefully defined."67 Another, referring to Einstein's theory of relativity, 
recognized "[a] very serious difficulty... in defining what is a newly 
discovered 'truth or fact,' as distinguished from the use that can be made of 
it in the practical and industrial arts."68 Second, courts and commentators 
began to tussle over the level and definition of "inventiveness" required for 
patent eligibility. Since 1851, the Supreme Court had required every 
invention to "be the product of 'more ingenuity and skill. .. than were 
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business."'6g The 
standard-amorphous and unworkable-was ardently condemned.7° 
Against this backdrop, agricultural researcher Varley Sherman Bond, in 
1938, filed for a patent directed to "a bacterial culture useful for the 
inoculation of the seeds of leguminous plants."7 1 Although the bacteria, 
Rhizobia, were well known and widely used in standard agricultural practice, 
the patentee had isolated and combined several strains of the bacteria that 
did not mutually inhibit one another.,. Because different crops responded 
to different strains of Rhizobium, the patentee had, in essence, developed a 
single Rhizobium inoculant that could be used for multiple crops.73 Rather 
than claiming a "one-size-fits-all" inoculant of specific Rhizobium strains, the 
patentee extended his claims to all ina cui ants "comprising a plurality of 
selected cultures... said cultures being substantially unaffected by each 
other."74 
In Funk Brothers, the Supreme Court invalidated the patent on the 
ground that Bond's inoculant "fell short of invention within the meaning of 
the patent statutes."75 In drawing that conclusion, however, the Court did 
not rely on its cases assessing the invention's level of "ingenuity" or "skiI1."76 
Nor did it reject the patent for being directed to a "principle"-"the idea 
67. Hector M. Holmes, Book Review, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1431, 1433 (1932) (reviewing CJ. 
HAMSON, PATENT RIGHTS FOR SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERlES (1930)). 
68. J. Lewis Stackpole, Book Review, 41 YALE LJ. 941, 941 (1932) (reviewing HAMSON, 
supra note 67). 
69. See Duffy, supra note 37, at 39 (alteration in original) (quoting Hotchkiss v. 
Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850)). 
70. 'd. at 42-43 (discussing several prominent judges' criticisms of the requirement). 
71. U.S. Patent No. 2,200,532 col. 111.2-4 (filed Aug. 24,1938). 
72. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 129-30 (1948). 
73. 'd. at 130. 
74· '53 2 Patent col. 1311.22-27. 
75. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131-32. 
76. See id. at 127-32; see also Duffy, supra note 37, at 39 (discussing Hotchkiss v. Greenwootfs 
requirement that inventions encompass "more ingenuity and skill ... than were possessed by an 
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business" (alteration in original) (quoting Hotchkiss v. 
Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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that there are compatible strains"-rather than an application of one.77 
Rather, the Court invalidated the patent on the basis that Bond's invention 
was "the work of nature" and that "patents cannot issue for the discovery of 
the phenomena of nature."78 
Unlike its predecessor cases, however, this appeal to "phenomena of 
nature" did not simply appear to be legal shorthand. Rather, it appeared to 
incorporate some of the scientific and naturalistic mysticism popular at the 
time.79 The Court described Rhizobium's nitrogen-fixing properties as "some 
mysterious process,"80 "part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men .... 
free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."81 These properties were 
"like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals,"82 and 
"serve[d] the ends nature originally provided and act[ed] quite 
independently of any effort of the patentee."83 Similarly, the Court 
characterized Bond's invention as "the handiwork of nature,"84 "nature's 
secret,"85 and an "ancient secret[] of nature."86 This language dramatically 
departed from the Court's earlier remarks on allowing patents for a "great, 
general, and most comprehensive principle in science or law of nature" as 
long as the inventor concretely applied them.87 
Both the dissent and the concurrence disputed the majority's notion of 
patent eligibility as divorced from the traditional understanding of the rule 
against patenting overbroad principles. In dissent, Justices Burton and 
Jackson simply did "not agree that the patent issued for such products is 
invalid for want of a clear, concise description of how the combinations were 
made and used."88 This concern with the patent's description paralleled the 
Court's reasoning in O'Reilly that overbroad claims prevented "some future 
inventor, in the onward march of science, [from] discover[ing] a mode of 
writing or printing at a distance ... without using any part of the process or 
77. Funk Bros., 333 u.s. at 133 (Frankfurter,]., concurring). 
78. [d. at 130 (majority opinion). 
79. See, e.g., Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, ATLANTIC Uuly I, 1945), http://perma.cc/ 
G7AL-R33Q ("Thus science may implement the ways in which man produces, stores, and 
consults the record of the race. It might be striking to outline the instrumentalities of the future 
more spectacularly, rather than to stick closely to the methods and elements now known and 
undergoing rapid development, as has been done here. Technical difficulties of all sorts have 
been ignored, certainly, but also ignored are means as yet unknown which may come any day to 
accelerate technical progress as violently as did the advent of the thermionic tube."). 
80. Funk Bros., 333 u.S. at 128. 
81. !d. at 130. 
82. !d. 
83. [d. at 131. 
84. [d. 
85. [d. at 132. 
86. [d. 
87· Le Royv. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156,175 (1852). 
88. Funk Bros., 333 u.S. at 136 (Burton,]., dissenting). 
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combination set forth in the plaintiff's specification."89 In concurrence, 
Justice Frankfurter agreed as to the invalidity of the patent because the 
claims were overbroad: "the phrase 'the claims cover a composite culture' 
might mean 'a particular composite culture' or 'any composite culture'" 
including those "quite different from Bond's composite culture."90 But 
Justice Frankfurter disagreed with the majority's "introduc[tion of] such 
terms as 'the work of nature' and the 'laws of nature.' For these are vague 
and malleable terms infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation."9 1 
In rejecting the scope and vag-Lleness of the majority's choice of language, 
Justice Frankfurter voiced a prescient concern: "Everything that happens may 
be deemed 'the work of nature' .... "92 
C. THE MODERN DOCTRINE OF PA TENT EllCIBILITY AND SCIENTffIC PHILOSOPHY 
Justice Frankfurter's axiom was perhaps truer than he realized. Since 
Funk Brothers, every Supreme Court opinion to substantively address patent 
eligibility has adopted the case's focus on "nature."93 In Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, the Court upheld a patent directed to a bacterium containing 
two synthetic pieces of circular DNA, or plasmids.94 The Court described the 
function of these plasmids as giving the bacteria a "property ... possessed by 
no naturally occurring bacteria,"95 with "markedly different characteristics 
from any found in nature ... and .... not nature's handiwork."96 This 
distinguished the invention from that in Funk Brothers because the claim 
encompassed not "a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but... a 
nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter. "97 
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Court 
considered patents for a method of optimizing the dosage of thiopurine 
drugs in treating Crohn's disease patients.98 The method simply directed a 
physician to "administer" the drug to a patient and then "determine" the 
level of a metabolite of that drug, where a level above or below certain values 
indicated a need to adjust the dosage accordingly.99 Like patents on 
"principles" before it, the patents' claims do "not confine [themselves] to 
[any] machinery or parts of machinery,"loo but rather sought a monopoly on 
89. O'Reillyv. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853). 
90. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 134 (Frankfurter,]., concurring). 
91. Id. at 134-35' 
92. [d. at 135 (emphasis added). 
93. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
94. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,3°5 (1980). 
95. [d. 
96. [d. at 310. 
97. [d. at 309. 
g8. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294-95 (2012). 
99. [d. at 1295. 
100. O'Reillyv. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853). 
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any "administration" of thiopurine followed by a "determination" of the 
quantity of their metabolites. 101 Nonetheless, the Court invalidated the 
patents on the grounds that they "set forth laws of nature."102 The 
relationship between thiopurine administration and its metabolites were 
"natural laws or natural phenomena," lo3 "natural responses" that were a 
consequence of human biology,104 or "natural correlations" between two 
events.105 Prometheus's claims, therefore, were unpatentable natural "laws," 
"phenomena," and "manifestations of nature," even though the Court 
recognized that "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, 
or apply laws of nature [or] natural phenomena. "106 
More recently, in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., the Supreme Court considered several patents encompassing two types 
of DNA molecules: DNA excised directly from chromosomes, or "isolated 
genomic DNA," and synthetic transcripts of only the coding portions of 
genes, or "cDNA"107 The opinion framed the issue as whether each class of 
molecules was "naturally occurring" or a "product of nature."IOB In its 
assessment, the Court heavily focused on the biochemical differences 
between isolated genomic DNA and cDNAlOg But it framed the differences 
largely in "natural" terms: whether each patented molecule was "naturally 
occurring," whether they were variants of "natural DNA," and whether their 
sequences were "dictated by nature."IIO These differences counseled against 
the patent eligibility of isolated genomic DNA as resulting from activity that 
was "not an act ofinvention."111 
Even the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding "abstract ideas"-
the historical ancestor of "principles"-has recently been infected with such 
language. In Gottschalk v. Benson-a case concerning the patentability of a 
mathematical formula for processing binary code-the Supreme Court 
101. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297-9S ("First, the 'administering' step simply refers to the 
relevant audience, namely doctors who treat patients with certain diseases with thiopurine 
drugs .... Second, the 'wherein' clauses simply tell a doctor about the relevant natural laws, at 
most adding a suggestion that he should take those laws into account when treating his 
patient. ... Third, the 'determining' step tells the doctor to determine the level of the relevant 
metabolites in the blood, through whatever process the doctor or the laboratory wishes to 
use .... The upshot is that the three steps simply tell doctors to gather data from which they 
may draw an inference in light of the correlations."). 
102. Id. at 1296. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 1305. 
105. Id. at 1296. 
106. Id. at 1293. 
107. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
lOS. Id. 
109. Id.at2114-15· 
110. Id. at 2119. 
Ill. Id. at 2117. 
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rejected the patent's claims as falling afoul of the prohibition on patenting 
"phenomena of nature."ll. Similarly, in Parker v. Flook, the Court construed 
its previous decisions as "[r] easoning that an algorithm ... is like a law of 
nature."ll3 As such, the Court invalidated the patentee's software process 
patent "not on the notion that natural phenomena are not processes, but 
rather on the more fundamental understanding that they are not ... 
'discoveries'" for the Constitution's purposes.l 14 And in Diamond v. Diehr, the 
Court upheld the patentees' claims to a computerized process for 
automatically curing rubber as "not unpatentable simply because it contains 
a law of nature."115 Despite this linguistic shift, the Court, in Bilski v. Kappos 
in 2010, boldly suggested that such language had been inherent in the 
patent eligibility statute for 150 years. 116 
These repeated invocations of natural "laws," "phenomenon," and 
"products" have never received any definition from the Supreme Court. The 
Court has made no attempt to impart on them any linguistic meaning, e.g., 
explications of the terms' ordinary usage in speech, dictionary definitions, 
or historical accounts of their concepts}l7 Nor has it attempted to provide 
them with any legal construction-normative judgments as to what natural 
"laws," "phenomena," or "products" should mean." S It provides no 
framework, no formula, and no list of factors to assess their construction. 
Nor does it tie them to historical concerns about descriptive overbreadth in 
patenting "principles."ll9 Rather, the Supreme Court has engaged in a 
fundamentally different type of analysis: analogies to a list of examples of 
what the Court thinks are obvious natural "laws," "phenomena," and 
"products." Those include "mineral [s] discovered in the earth," "new 
plant[s] found in the wild," the equation E=mc·, gravity, electromagnetism, 
steam power, "the heat of the sun, electricity, [and] the qualities of metals," 
112. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1972) ("As we stated in [Funk Brothers]' He 
who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it 
which the law recognizes .... We dealt there with a 'product' claim, while the present case deals 
with a 'process' claim. But we think the same principle applies." (citation omitted) (quoting 
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948» (internal quotation 
marks omitted». 
113· Parkerv. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978). 
114· Id. at 593. 
115. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 590). 
116. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
117. Cf Tun:Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in 
Patent Law, 123 YALE LJ. 530, 543-48 (2013) (describing the facets of "interpretation" in claim 
construction) . 
118. Cf id. at 549-52. 
119. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
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among others.'2o This is simply unlike other areas of the Court's 
jurisprudence that confront vague terminology in legal rules or standards.' 2. 
Patent eligibility's ever-growing list of excluded "sciency things" does 
little, if anything, to explain what exactly natural "laws," "phenomena," or 
"products" are. Declaring that one cannot patent "E=mc"," for example, does 
not tell us why it is a "law" or a "phenomenon," which one of the two it is, or 
whether it can be both at the same time. Nor does it begin to resolve the 
fundamental problem of distinguishing natural laws from man-made 
representations of them.'·2 Assuming that "gravity" must be excluded from 
patentable subject matter informs us little about which other scientific 
concepts must similarly be excluded. Prohibiting patents on 
electromagnetism, electricity, and steam power-even when such powers 
result solely from man-made activity-does little to elucidate what, legally, 
makes them unpatentable natural "phenomena." And concluding that one 
cannot patent wild plants or extracted minerals as "products of nature" does 
nothing more than leave that controlling term hopelessly void of meaning. 
This list of scientific concepts, therefore, likely serves one particular 
function for the Supreme Court: as a collection of concepts that the Court 
believes scientists would agree on as natural "laws," "phenomena," and 
"products." This understanding seems to explain some of the Court's 
language concerning its own difficulties in making patent eligibility 
determinations. In his dissent in Laboratory Corp. oj America Holdings v. 
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., Justice Stephen Breyer paused to "concede that 
120. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012); 
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006) (Breyer,]', 
dissenting) . 
121. See cases cited supra note 12. 
122. Kevin Emerson Collins has written extensively on how patentable subject matter's 
prohibitions on "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are prohibitions on 
man-made representations of "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas," however 
defined. E.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of "An Unpatentable Abstract Idea, .. 
15 LEWIs & CLARK L. REv. 37, 46 (2011) [hereinafter Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity) 
(analogizing patents on abstract ideas to representations of mental phenomena as patents on 
drugs are to patents on chemical formulas); Kevin Emerson 'Collins, Prometheus Laboratories, 
Mental Steps, and Printed Matter, 50 HOus. L. REv. 391, 395-97 (20 12) (describing how 
restrictions on patenting abstract ideas are actually prohibited on representations of abstract ideas 
in the context of the printed matter doctrine); Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 
SMU L. REv. 317, 329 (2007) (describing patents on abstract ideas as "mental representations 
of knowledge"). 
This issue has also, of course, occupied a central place in the philosophy of science. E.g., 
D.M. ARMSTRONG, WHAT ISA LAw OF NATURE? 13 (1983) ("A gap can open up between law and 
manifestation of law." (emphasis added»; NANCY CARTIVRlGHT, How THE LAws OF PHYSICS LIE 
129 (1983) ("[N)ature is not governed by simple quantitative equations of the kind we write in 
our fundamental theories .... [F)undamental equations do not govern objects in reality; they 
govern only objects in models."); Fred I. Dretske, Laws of Nature, 44 PHIL. SCI. 248, 249 n.4 
(1977) ("I will also, sometimes, speak of laws and statements of law indifferently. I think, 
however, that it is a serious mistake to conflate these two notions." (emphasis added». 
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the category of nonpatentable '[p] henomena of nature,' like the categories 
of 'mental processes' and 'abstract intellectual concepts,' is not easy to 
define." 123 Similarly, in Mayo, the Court declined the patent holder's 
invitation to discern among different types of natural "laws," not because the 
issue may not have been illustrative, but because "[c]ourts and judges are 
not institutionally well suited to making the kinds of judgments needed to 
distinguish among different laws of nature."124 Mayo's assertion may partially 
explain the Court's choice of popularly known scientific developments, such 
as electricity and steam power, even when other lesser-known examples from 
actually litigated cases, such as the Arrhenius equation in Diehr,'25 remain 
available. 
Patent eligibility's "natural" terms are, therefore, the Supreme Court's 
attempt to introduce a scientific or philosophical meaning into natural 
"laws," "phenomena," and "products." It focuses on what the Court believes 
science or philosophy considers "laws of nature," "natural phenomena," and 
"products of nature." And, like early twentieth-century debates on granting 
patents to pure scientific discoveries, it struggles with the difficulties of 
distinguishing scientific concepts. 126 Contrary to the doctrine's historical 
focus on patenting "principles," patent eligibility's "natural" terms are more 
scientific and philosophical than legal. 
II. NATURAL COMPLEXI1Y AND NATURAL LAws, PHENOMENA, AND PRODUCTS 
Given the Supreme Court's approach to patent eligibility's "natural" 
terms, science or philosophy would appear to be natural sources of 
discourse to help crystallize their meanings. After all, "What is a law of 
nature?" is a central question for the philosophy of science. 127 
Unfortunately, neither science nor philosophy has provided any clarity. 
Rather, the issues surrounding the terms' meanings have long been-and 
are still-hotly debated. 128 Regularity, universality, functionality, 
probabilism, necessitation, and contingency-all complicate a 
straightforward definition.'29 At the same time, one avenue of scientific 
philosophy centers around these very difficulties: natural complexity. 
123. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 134 (Breyer,]., dissenting) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 
584,589 (1978)). 
124. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. 
125. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177-81 (1981). The Arrhenius equation generally 
describes the effect of temperature on chemical reaction rates. See Keith ]. Laidler, The 
Development of the Arrhenius Equation, 61]' CHEMICAL EDUC. 494, 494 (1984). 
126. See Sichelman, supra note 9, at 10 ("[Sjeparating the 'natural' from the 'synthetic' is 
not so simple a task."); supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
127. See, e.g., philosophy sources cited supra note 122. 
128. See, e.g., philosophy sources cited supra note 122. See generally THE OXFORD COMPANION 
TO PHILOSOPHY 506-07 (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 2005) (discussing various philosophical 
approaches to defining a "law of nature"). 
129. See generally ARMSTRONG, supra note 122. 
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Complexity, generally, is the measure of three facets of a system: (1) the 
number of elements, or components, present in the system; (2) the variety 
of those elements; and (3) the interrelationships between those elements.
'
30 
As those facets increase, a system becomes increasingly "complex."131 A 
simple wristwatch, for example, may contain nothing more than a fixed gear 
and a tension spring, turning a single hand. But wristwatches often involve 
many more components-several gears and springs, and, often, multiple 
measures of time. Those components, in turn, often come in several 
varieties, sizes, and shapes. And all of the components are, in one way or 
another, interconnected-the absence of a single gear or spring can affect 
the performance of many other components, and sometimes fatally SO.'32 
Such a watch is "complex," in philosophical terms. '33 
The principle effect of complexity is cognitive. 134 Complexity hinders 
our ability to reduce a system to its component parts, to understand a 
system's causes and effects, and to describe or explain a system with either 
completeness or certainty.135 Difficulties in understanding how a complex 
wristwatch works may arise simply because of difficulties in determining 
which components are required, or how the components affect the watch's 
movement, either individually or in combination. '36 It may also be difficult 
to understand how a complex wristwatch works because we may lack the 
words to describe its components or those components' interactions with 
130. RESCHER, supra note 16, at 1 (defining one form of complexity as "the number and 
variety of an item's constituent elements and of the elaborateness of their interrelational 
structure") . 
131. See id. at 8-16 (giving examples of increasingly complex systems). 
132. This, however, is not always the case in complex systems. One branch of complexity 
theory, complex adaptive systems, or CAS, describes how certain complex systems can adapt to 
changes in their configuration despite their interconnected nature. See generally John H. 
Holland, Complex Adaptive Systems, DAEDALUS, Winter 1992, at 17. J.B. Ruhl has written 
numerous articles on how various areas of the law similarly adapt despite their complexity. E.g., 
].B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call 
for Legal &ductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE LJ. 849 (1996); ].B. Ruhl, 
Law's Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. V. L. REv. 885 (2008);].8. Ruhl & Harold]. Ruhl,Jr., The 
Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing 
Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 405 
(1997); ].B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and 
Society and Its Practical Meaningfor Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1407 (1996). 
133. See HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 188-90 (3d ed. 1996). 
134. See RESCHER, supra note 16, at 16 ("All in all, then, the best overall index we have of a 
system's complexity is the extent to which resources (of time, energy, ingenuity) must be 
expanded on its cognitive domestication."). 
135. See id. at 16-21 (describing the cognitive difficulties with complex systems). 
136. See SIMON, supra note 133, at 188-90 (recounting the watchmaker parable). 
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one another. 137 We may also simply lack the cognitive operators to 
understand the watch as a whole. 138 
So, too, with nature. Since 1850, almost every scientific discipline has 
seen the introduction, development, and adoption of radical theories and 
practices that have changed our understanding of the simplicity--or lack 
thereof--of the natural world. Scientists unearthed countless new objects 
and forces previously hidden from view: new sub-atomic particles and forces 
in physics; DNA and genes in biology; continental plates in earth science; 
and more. 139 The number of specialties in almost every scientific discipline 
multiplied many times over. 14° And through interdisciplinary research, 
science has uncovered a network of innumerable interrelationships in 
nature. 141 These revolutions, in turn, fed an explosive increase in the 
amount of scientific research and information. Since 1850, the quantity and 
funding of scientific research has, accordingly, exponentially increased. 142 
The amount of scientific literature is now likely produced at one thousand 
times the rate it was then. 143 And so many people now work as professional 
scientists that over eighty percent of all the scientists who have ever lived are 
living nOW.'44 
137. See RESCHER, supra note 16, at 14 (discussing cognitive difficulties in ontological 
complexity). 
138. See id, 
139, See 15 CHARLES DARV.1N, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Paul H, Barrett & RB, Freeman 
eds" Pickering & Chatto Ltd. 1988) (1859) (discussing evolution and natural selection); 2 
MICHAEL B, GREEN ET AI..., SUPERSTRING THEORY (1987); WERNER HEISENBERG, THE PHYSICAL 
PRINCIPLES OF THE QUANTUM THEORY (Carl Eckhart & Frank C, Hoyt trans" 1930); A.A, Penzias 
& R, W, Wilson, A Measurement of Excess Antenna Temperature at 4080 Mc/s, 142 AsTROPHYSICAL]' 
419 (1965); FJ. Vine & D,H, Matthews, Magnetic Anomalies over Oceanic Ridges, 199 NATURE 947 
(1963) (demonstrating the existence of magnetic striations over the seafloor, proof of seafloor 
"spreading" and "continental ~rift"); ].D, Watson & F,H,C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic 
Acids: A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737 (1953) (discussing the discovery of 
the structure of DNA); Count K.A.H, Marner, Rector, Royal Caroline Inst., Presentation 
Speech: Award Ceremony Speech (Dec. 10, 1905), available at http://perma,cc/BZV3-AU6X 
(awarding Robert Koch the 1905 Nobel Prize in medicine for his "discover[y of] the causes of 
individual diseases," i.e" microbes); see also THOMAS S, KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS III (3d ed, 1996) ("[Alfter a revolution scientists are responding to a different 
world,"), 
140, RESCHER, supra note 16, at 75-77 (recounting the growth and increase in the number 
of subdivisions in the sciences), 
14!. [d, at 45 (describing how scientific interdisciplinarity "broaden[sl one's notion of a 
natural phenomenon to include not just the processes themselves, , , but also the relationships 
among them"), 
142, See id, at 75-77 (discussing the growth of scientific research), 
143, See id, at 76 (computing the rate of production of scientific literature to increase ten-
fold every fifty years) , 
144, [d, 
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Beginning in the 1940s, scientists and philosophers proposed that this 
growth was itself extraordinary.'45 In the words of Philip W. Anderson, the 
recipient of the 1977 Nobel Prize in physics, "More Is Different."'46 More 
scientific information uncovered a vast, varied, and interrelated web of 
information that could "not... be understood in terms of a simple 
extrapolation of the properties of a few particles."'47 Rather, this increase in 
scientific information made it appear that "[a]t each stage [of inquiry] 
entirely new laws, concepts, and generalizations [were] necessary" to 
theorize the whole. '48 This all implied the radical notion that "[t]he ability 
to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws [did] not imply the ability 
to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe."'49 
These observations gave rise to the study of "natural complexity,"'50 or 
the cognitive difficulties with synthesizing how the Earth's "many biological 
and physical components interact across all space and time scales."'5
' 
Because "natural reality has an infinite descriptive depth,"'52 natural 
complexity counsels us to "abandon the idea that our linguistic resources 
can-at least in the theoretical long run-fully characterize the descriptive 
nature of the real."l53 Thus, the ultimate problem with terms like natural 
"laws," "phenomena," and "products" is that such terms "are inevitably 
inadequate to explain by themselves the phenomena as we actually observe 
them."'54 Three features-constancy and causality, probabilism, and 
fundamentalism--demonstrate the terms' inadequacy In describing 
naturally complex systems. 
145. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 17, at 540 ("These problems-and a wide range of similar 
problems in the biological, medical, psychological, economic, and political sciences-are just 
too complicated to yield to the old nineteenth-century techniques which were so dramatically 
successful on two-, three-, or four-variable problems of simplicity. These new problems, 
moreover, cannot be handled with the statistical techniques so effective in describing average 
behavior in problems of disorganized complexity."). 
146. Anderson, supra note 20, at 393. 
147. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. /d. 
150. RESCHER, supra note 16, at 50-52 (summarizing the procession of natural complexity). 
151. Nicholas W. Watkins & Mervyn P. Freeman, Natural Complexity, 320 SCIENCE 323, 323 
(2008) (describing natural complexity from a geoscience perspective). 
152. REsCHER, supra note 16, at 28. 
153. [d. at 33. Interestingly, several other scholars have written about the limits of language 
in other areas of patent law. See, e.g., Andrew Chin, The Ontological Function of the Patent 
Document, 74 U. PITT. L. REv. 293, 299-305 (2012) (describing the limits of language in 
defining what constitutes enablement); supra note 122 (citing works by Kevin Emerson Collins 
discussing what constitutes an "abstract idea"). 
154. RESCHER, supra note 16, at 31. 
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A. CONSTANCY AND CAUSAliTY 
Natural "laws" or "phenomena" classically require two factors: 
(1) constancy, or, as termed by the philosopher David Hume, a "constant 
conjunction"; and (2) causality. I;; If event A happens in conjunction with 
event B, this is only a "law" or a "phenomenon" if event A always occurs in 
conjunction with event B. If, for example, water always boils (event A) when 
it is heated to 1000e (event B), then we have satisfied Hume's constancy 
requirement. '56 Accidents happen, however. That is, sometimes events 
repeatedly, even always, occur in co~unction with one another that have no 
causal link between the two. One famous example is the statement, 
"Whenever I go to Paris, it rains."'57 Even taking this statement as true-and 
therefore, satisfying the Humean constancy requirement-does not make it 
a natural "law" because the speaker's presence in Paris is surely not causing it 
to rain.
'
58 Rather, the speaker is simply the victim of unerring bad luck and 
Paris the host of bad weather. 
Separating repetitive accidents from repeatable causal events is the 
classical philosophical problem of induction.
'
59 That is, how can we 
inductively generalize facts about the world given the epistemological 
uncertainty about any two events' constancy and causality? In the classical 
school, at least, natural "laws" or "phenomena" are only those pairings of 
events that can be inductively determined to be both universally constant and 
universally causal. I60 This view of natural laws and phenomena consequently 
implies that the terms occupy an immensely broad scope. For a natural 
relationship to be a "law" or a "phenomenon" it must "stipulate-quite 
ambitiously-how things are always and everywhere.",61 
Natural complexity complicates this analysis. As a natural system 
becomes more complex, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine 
whether any observed natural relationships are either constant or causal. I62 
155. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra note 128, at 506 (emphasis omitted). 
The twinning of constancy and causality in natural "laws" or "phenomena" is an almost 
infinitely rich topic in the philosophy of science. See generally G.E.M. Anscombe, Professor of 
Philosophy, Univ. of Cambridge, Inaugural Lecture Before the University of Cambridge (May 6, 
1971), in CAUSALITY AND DETERMINATION (1971) (describing the state of the field). The 
purpose of this Subpart, however, is to simply describe the prevailing, classical view of constancy 
and causality. 
156. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra note 128, at 506. 
157. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
158. See id. 
159. For a brief account of the traditional problem of induction, see MARIo BUNGE, 
CAUSALITY AND MODERN SCIENCE 251-55 (Transaction Publishers 4th ed. 2009) (1959). 
160. But see NANCY CARTWRIGHT, THE DAPPLED WORLD: A STUDY OF THE BOUNDARIES OF 
SCIENCE 148-49 (1999) (criticizing this view). 
161. RESCHER, supra note 16, at 65. 
162. See Anderson, supra note 20, at 393 ("The constructionist hypothesis breaks down 
when confronted with the twin difficulties of scale and complexity. The behavior of large and 
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As the number, variety, and interconnectedness of elements in a system 
increases, determining which elements cause which events becomes a much 
harder task. Isolating and identifying not simply which elements are 
responsible for a particular natural phenomenon, but which interactions of 
those elements give rise to it greatly hinders our ability to distill what causes a 
particular phenomenon. This hindrance ultimately means that in naturally 
complex systems "there may often be no way of telling whether something 
proposed as a cause of some effect was in fact required for the occurrence of 
that effect."163 Which cellular factors contribute to cancer, for example, is a 
famously complex question "that is already complex almost beyond 
measure." 164 As a result, even the best attempts by researchers to reduce 
cancer to several causal or constant "hallmarks" have generally failed. 165 
Natural "laws" or "phenomena" of cancer simply elide over research's ability 
to "add[] further layers of complexity."166 
In other instances, constancy and causality may exist at one level of 
complexity, but vanish entirely at another. Newton's law of universal 
gravitation, for example, describes the relationship between two objects' 
mass and distance and the gravitational force between them. 167 But it is both 
complex aggregates of elementary particles, it turns out, is not to be understood in terms of a 
simple extrapolation of the properties of a few particles."); see also CAR1WRIGHT, supra note 160, 
at 25-26 (discussing how complexity makes problematic "treating a real situation [by) ... 
piec[ing) together a model from these fixed components"); JOHN DUPRE, THE DISORDER OF 
THINGS: METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DISUNITY OF SCIENCE 103 (1993) ("I suspect that 
the complex interdependencies of entities at many different levels of structural complexity 
characteristic of biology is sufficient to show the implausibility of the reductionistic project."). 
163. DUPRE, supra note 162, atl84. 
164. Douglas Hanahan & Robert A. Weinberg, The Hallmarks of Cancer, 100 CELL 57, 57 
(2000); see also CAR1WRIGHT, supra note 160, at 17-18 (discussing this in the philosophy of 
science context). 
165. In their famous paper in 2000, notable cancer researchers Douglas Hanahan and 
Robert A. Weinberg proposed reducing cancer to six cellular "hallmarks" that appeared to be 
present in almost all cancers. Hanahan & Weinberg, supra note 164, at 57. But this attempt to 
impose constancy on a complex natural system eventually gave way; ironically, Hanahan and 
Weinberg's "hallmark" principle has itself "complexified'" Since its publication, the authors 
have added two more hallmarks, while other scientists have noted that many of the hallmarks 
apply to noncancerous tumors, as well. Douglas Hanahan & Robert A. Weinberg, Hallmarks of 
Cancer: The Next Generation, 144 CELL 646 (2011) (adding additional hallmarks); see also 
Sebastien L. Floor et aJ., Hallmarks of Cancer: Of All Cancer Cells, All the Time?, 18 TRENDS 
MOLECULAR MED. 509, 514 (2012) (discussing how "the complexity of in vivo human cancer ... 
explains why it is so difficult to treat cancer"); Yuri Lazebnik, What Are the Hallmarks of Cancer?, 
10 NATURE REVIEWS CANCER 232,232 (2010) (questioning whether "the proposed hallmarks of 
cancer [are) indeed such" given "the puzzling complexity of numerous and interrelated 
properties of cancers"). 
166. Hanahan & Weinberg, supra note 164, at 57. 
167. LARRy D. KIRKPATRICK & GREGORY E. FRANCIS, PHYSICS: A WORLD VIEW 79 (6th ed. 
2007). 
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empirically and philosophically not universal.!68 It does much to describe 
the primary attractive force between celestially sized objects, like planets, but 
in some naturally complex systems, such as those with a variety of smaller 
objects, the regularity of Newton's law is called into question. Indeed, the 
"universal" law of gravity seemingly fails to apply on microscopic levels 
because other forces, like electricity and magnetism, completely dominate 
its effect.!6g 
A number of scientific philosophers similarly dispute the existence of 
constancy and causality in biology.!70 The complexity of biological diversity 
is, after all, simply the product of historical accident: "Rewind the tape of 
evolutionary history and play it again as many times as you will; it will never 
be the same twice."!7! Discerning causal or constant factors from this 
history-that is, identifying "laws" "phenomena," or even "products" in 
biology-is simply impossible. On this point, John Beatty, a philosopher of 
biology, declared that "there are no laws of biology. For, whatever 'laws' are, 
they are supposed to be more than just contingently true."l7" At another 
level, some biological processes are so complex, that one can regard each 
instance of them as practically unique.!73 This sentiment illustrates the 
problem of constancy and causality in natural "laws" and "phenomena" in 
general: that" [i] t is quite impossible to have for unique phenomena general 
laws like those that exist in classical mechanics."!74 
B. PROBABIUSM 
Where constancy and causality fail, "probabilism"-the use of 
probabilities or statistics as the basis for inductive reasoning-begins. l75 As 
168. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 122, at 56-57 (discussing gravity); DUPRE, supra note 162, 
at 185 ("[Dleterminism claims that there are exceptionless universal laws of nature. 
Notoriously, the truth of such laws cannot be empirically established."). 
169. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 122, at 57-59. Some physicists have responded to this 
philosophical criticism of gravity by arguing that simply because other forces drown out gravity'S 
effect at the quantum level does not make it less of a "law." See, e.g., STEVEN WEINBERG, DREAMS 
OF A FINAL THEORY 91-g5 (1993) (discussing gravity as a history of "anomalies" but a law 
nonetheless). But this argument fails to address the classical requirement that "laws" as "laws," 
as opposed to just statistical regularities or coincidences, must be universal. See infra Part n.B 
(discussing this counterargument with respect to probabilism). 
170. See, e.g., John Beatty, The Evolutionary Contingency Thesis, in CONCEPTS, THEORIES, AND 
RATIONALI1Y IN THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 45, 46-47 (Gereon Wolters et al. eds., 1995); JJ.C. 
SMART, PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM 59-61 (1963). 
171. PAUL S. ACUTTER & DENYS N. WHEATLEY, ABOUT LIFE: CONCEPTS IN MODERN BIOLOGY 
128 (2007) (paraphrasing Stephen Jay Gould). 
172. Beatty, supra note 170, at 46. 
173. See Ernst Mayr, Cause and Effect in Biology, 134 SCIENCE 1501,1505 (1961) (discussing 
the "uniqueness" of biology). 
174. Id. 
175. See DUPRE, supra note 162, at 194 (discussing probabilism as "residual deterministic 
[i.e., causal and constant] thinking"). 
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some natural systems become more complex, the "laws" that govern them, 
or the "phenomena" that explain them, must be increasingly couched in 
mathematical terms.'76 The Nbody problem in physics perhaps serves as the 
best example. The "law of gravity" provides an equation for the gravitational 
force of one body, N, on another, depending on its mass and the distance 
between them.'77 The law is ideal when one body is fixed in space (an 
admittedly unrealistic situation) because each body will effect a gravitational 
pull on the other. As the number of bodies increases, however, the law 
begins to break down. Strange though it may seem, for a larger number of 
Ns, i.e., the system becomes more complex, and the universal law of gravity 
becomes more embedded in statistical probability than mathematical 
certainty.17S 
In other instances, the probabilistic conclusions of experiments in 
naturally complex systems are regarded as "laws" or "phenomena" 
themselves. 179 Epidemiology-the study of "the health of a population ... as 
a complex adaptive system"-must contend with a countless number, variety, 
and interdependency of factors: "history, culture,... socioeconomic 
structures," environment, ecosystems, and others. lso And whatever 
conclusions can be drawn from such research are often bound in the 
language of statistics, e.g., confidence intervals, p-values, and Mantel-
Haenszel odds ratios. lSI Yet, such conclusions are often conceived of as 
embodying the causalities of a system, i.e., as "laws" or "phenomena" 
themselves, rather than mathematical observations. IS. This leap, from 
mathematical observation to explanation of reality, suffers from what 
176. See id. at 184 ("[O]ur most successful scientific theories describe a probabilistic rather 
than a deterministic world."). See generally 2 THE PROBABILISTIC REVOLUTION: IDEAS IN THE 
SCIENCES (Lorenz KrUger et al. eds., 1990) (discussing the increase in probabilism in 
psychology, sociology, economics, physiology, evolutionary biology, and physics). 
177. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
178. See generally PATRlCK SUPPES, PROBABILISTIC METAPHYSICS 12S-30 (1984) (discussing 
the history and implications of the Nbody problem). 
179. But see CARTWRlGHT, supra note 122, at IS4 (describing and rejecting this approach); 
CARTWRIGHT, supra note 160, at 111-12 (same). 
180. Neil Pearce & Franco Merletti, Complexity, Simplicity, and Epidemiology, 3S INT'L J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY SIS, SI6-17 (2006). 
181. Sandro Galea et aI., Causal Thinking and Complex System Approaches in Epidemiology, 39 
INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 97, 101 (2010) ("Epidemiological methods, frequently married with 
biostatistical techniques and approaches, continue to dwell, almost entirely, on the analysis of 
data that are collected through epidemiological studies and the application of various statistical 
techniques to document association present in the data collected."). 
182. See id. at 100-()1 ("Although epidemiological methods are predicated on population-
based methods that should, in a perfect world, be used only for group-level inference, 
epidemiologists are nonetheless accustomed to thinking of our methods as providing insight 
into individual health and disease formation. The epidemiological concern with individual 
health and disease poses a substantial challenge to methods, such as complex systems dynamic 
models .... "). 
THE NATURAL COMPLEXITY OF PATENT EUGIBIUTY 
scientific philosopher Nancy Cartwright terms the "simulacrum account of 
explanation": 
I do not think these distributions are real. Statistical mechanics 
works in a massive number of highly differentiated and highly 
complex situations. In the vast majority of these it is incredible to 
think that there is a true probability distribution for that situation; 
and proofs that, for certain purposes, one distribution is as good as 
another, do not go any way to making it plausible that there is one 
at all. It is better, I think, to see these distributions as 
fictions .... ,83 
Thus, terms like natural "laws" or "phenomena" in complex, probabilistic 
fields should have significantly less force: they are less "laws" or 
"phenomena" of nature than they are "laws" or "phenomena" of a statistical, 
"simulacrum account" of observations of nature. 
Similarly, defining a "product" of nature is also often an exercise in 
probabilism, complicated by natural complexity. What scientists refer to as a 
"typical" human gene, for example, actually encompasses a wide variety of 
genetic sequences within the human population.·84 Determining the 
archetypal sequence of that gene, the "consensus sequence," is therefore 
very much a product of statistics, rather than the specific identification of a 
gene with the consensus sequence as it actually exists in nature.'85 
Characterizing a particular genetic sequence as a "natural product" is 
consequently a two-step act of probabilism: using statistical methodology to 
determine a consensus sequence, and then using statistical methodology to 
subsequently determine whether the studied genetic sequence is similar 
enough to the consensus sequence to be considered equivalent. Even this, 
however, does not necessarily resolve the issue of whether a particular 
genetic sequence is a natural "product" because there are "a massive 
number of highly differentiated and highly complex" methods to compute 
similarity.'86 Recently, researchers' efforts to determine how much of the 
human genome was covered by patents claiming "an isolated DNA having at 
least 15 nucleotides" of a particular sequence erupted into a fiery debate 
over methodology.'87 This has all "led these biologists into a philosophical 
183. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 122, at 154. 
184. See Michele Cargill et aL, Characterization of Single-Nucleotide Polymarphisms in Coding 
Regions of Human Genes, 22 NATURE GENETICS 231,232-33 (1999) (measuring the diversity of 
polymorphisms in 106 human genes). 
185. Thomas D. Schneider, Consensus Sequence Zen, 1 APPLIED BIOINFORMATICS Ill, Ill, 
113 (2002). 
186. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 122, at 154. 
187. Compare Jeffrey Rosenfeld & Christopher E. Mason, Peroasive Sequence Patents Cover the 
Entire Human Genome, 5 GENOME MED. 27 (2013) (claiming that randomized, 15 nucleotide 
DNA sequences cover approximately 41 % of all human genes), and Christopher Mason, Dr. 
Chris Mason Responds to Blog Posts on Genome Medicine Article-Updated, PATENT Docs (Apr. 10, 
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trap: confounding the model of reality (the consensus sequence) with 
reality."188 Ultimately, if natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products" are 
"irreducibly probabilistic .... [They] may often be limited to distinguishing 
factors that influence the probability of the effect to be explained .... But 
that is the most to which we can legitimately aspire."'89 
C. FuNDAMENTAliSM 
As a general matter, natural "laws" and "phenomena" imply a sense of 
"fundamentalism": that is, whether a law or a phenomena is wholly 
irreducible, and therefore, "fundamental," or, rather, a construct of other 
irreducible laws. '90 Under this framework, the photon theory of light-that 
light is composed of smaller subunits, termed "photons"-is a "fundamental 
law" or a "phenomenon" because it cannot be reduced any further. The heat 
radiating properties of light, however, are not fundamental "laws" or 
"phenomena" in this sense because they are reducible: they can be 
explained by photon theory.191 Light's propensity to heat a target is actually 
photons' propensity to heat a target. Under a fundamentalist interpretation, 
at least, natural "laws" and "phenomena" are only those observations that 
meet at "the point of convergence of all our arrows of explanation."19o 
Natural complexity, however, upends this distinction because, often, 
"[t]he behavior of large and complex aggregates of elementary particles, it 
turns out, is not to be understood in terms of a simple extrapolation of the 
properties of a few particles."193 Rather, "at each level of complexity entirely 
new properties appear" that cannot be explained by simply reducing that 
2013, 11:59 PM), http://perma.cc/7KEH-P64Y (same), with Donald Zuhn, Genome Medicine 
Article Calls for Limits on Patenting of Existing Nucleotide Sequences, PATENT Docs (Apr. 2, 2013, 
11:59 PM), http://perma.cc/5SSM-VGSU (criticizing the study's methodology and application 
to patent law), and Donald Zuhn, Revisiting Genome Medicine Article on "Peroasive Sequence Patents" 
that "Cover the Entire Human Genome, "PATENT Docs (Apr. S, 2013, 11:59 PM), http://perma.cc/ 
HS7W-TYPK (same), and Kevin E. Noonan, A Response to Dr. Mason's "Rebuttal" to Criticisms of His 
Genomics Medicine Article, PATENT Docs (Apr. II, 2013, 11:59 PM), http://perma.cc/K2UV-
U7TT (same), and Donald Zuhn, A Primer on Claim Construction-Comments on Dr. Mason's 
Response, PATENT Docs (Apr. 11,2013,11:55 PM), http://perma.cc/ 4MQT-EJ23 (same). 
ISS. See Schneider, supra note 185, at liS. 
IS9. DUPRE, supra note 162, at IS4. 
190. See WEINBERG, supra note 169, at 144-49 (discussing fundamentalism and explanatory 
power). 
191. See id. at 20 ("We have an overwhelming sense that the photon theory of light is more 
fundamental than any statement about heat radiation and is therefore the explanation of the 
properties of heat radiation. And in the same way, although Newton derived his famous laws of 
motion in part from the earlier laws of Kepler that describe the motion of planets in the solar 
system, we say that Newton's laws explain Kepler's, not the other way around."). 
192. [d. at 43; accord Philip W. Anderson, Physics: The opening to Complexity, 92 PROC. NAT'L 
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6653, 6653 (1995) ("[Ilgnorance about these laws persists only on the extreme 
scales of the very small, the very cosmic, or the very weak and subtle."). 
193. Anderson, supra note 20, at 393. 
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system to its component parts. 194 Understanding the molecular structure of 
water, for example, does little to explain why each snowflake forms its own 
unique crystalline pattern.'95 This principle of "emergence" has long been 
one of the defining features of complex systems. 196 
Emergence has several consequences for using the terms "laws," 
"phenomena," or "products" to describe naturally complex systems. First, 
emergence equalizes, across scientific fields, the existence of events arguably 
termed "laws" or "phenomena" because almost all scientific fields have 
irreducible, and therefore, fundamental properties. This counsels against a 
"hierarchy of sciences" where some sciences contain such "fundamental 
laws," while others are mere applications of them; emergence "does not 
imply that science X is 1ust applied Y."'197 Therefore, if the laws or 
phenomena that govern elementary particle physics are only "natural laws" 
or "phenomena" because their behavior reduces to smaller component 
parts, then emergence suggests that the "laws" governing the social sciences 
are equally so because we have difficulty reducing concepts like rational 
choice, dichotomous balloting, or television's effect on violence.'98 
Second, emergent phenomena complicate distinguishing "natural 
products" from those that are the result of human intervention in naturally 
complex processes. The immune system, for example, produces antibodies, 
the workhorses of the immune system, in response to foreign 
macromolecules, or antigens.'99 Whether a synthetic vaccine actually confers 
immunity on a particular patient therefore depends on whether the immune 
system produces antibodies to the vaccine antigens. But such antibodies are 
"emergent entities that are defined by their specific antibody partners and 
exist only in the context of the immune system" unique to the individual in 
which they are produced.·oo This complicates the question of whether any 
particular antibody produced in response to human intervention-in this 
example, the administration of antigens-is a natural product rather than a 
byproduct of this synthetic utilization of emergent phenomena. Such 
antibodies exist only due to human activity, and yet are created 
, independently from human control. The same could also be said of species 
194. [d, 
195. Bruce C. Gibb, Reaching Out to Complexity, 1 NATURE CHEMISTRY 252, 252 (2009) 
(describing snowflake formation through complexity and emergence). 
196. R.B, Laughlin & David Pines, The Theory of Everything, 97 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U,S. 
28,30 (2000) (discussing emergence). 
197. Anderson, supra note 20, at 393. 
198. William A. Gorton, The Philosaphy of Social Science, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
http://perma.cc/5BC7-C6J4 (last visited Jan. 16,2014), 
199. See Holland, supra note 132, at 18-19. 
200. Marc H.v. Van Regenmortel, Reductionism and Complexity in Molecular Biology, 5 EMBO 
REp. 1016, 1019 (2004). 
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altered by climate change or exotic particles from "atom-smasher" 
experiments. 
Lastly, emergence suggests, in fact, that some "fundamental laws" or 
"phenomena" may not be fundamental after all-not because they are 
irreducible, but because they simply fail to govern emergent properties of 
their aggregates. That is, even "grant[ing] that a law is true-even a law of 
'basic' physics or a law about the so-called 'fundamental particles'-is far 
from admitting that it is universal-that it holds everywhere and governs in 
all domains.''201 Some "phase transitions" in physical chemistry-the dividing 
lines between phases of matter, like liquids or solids-demonstrate this 
aphorism because they are subject to emergent properties that appear to 
directly oppose the "fundamental laws" governing their components. For 
example, certain iron-based magnets, cooled below certain temperatures, 
display magnetic direction even though the "fundamental laws" governing 
magnetism concerning their individual atoms in isolation would dictate 
otherwise.202 This highlights the paradox of calling either of these properties 
fundamental "laws of nature." For, "if one thinks that laws are among the 
fundamental facts we hope to discover about the universe, such dependency 
will seem a serious embarrassment."2og 
III. THE EFFECTS OF NATURAL COMPLEXIlY ON PATENT EUGIBILIlY 
Natural complexity therefore confounds classical notions of natural 
"laws," "phenomena," and "products." It places significant cognitive 
difficulties on determining whether "laws" or "phenomena" are either 
constant or causal, as is traditionally required. It further muddies clear 
definitions of natural "laws," "phenomena," or "products" by tying such 
terms to probabilistic determinants. And it repudiates patent eligibility's 
natural terms' adherence to principles of fundamentalism. 
Because the Supreme Court's historical reliance on such terms is 
tethered to a scientific understanding of them, the difficulties complexity 
imparts on patent eligibility's "natural" terms account for several of the 
doctrine's troubles. First, patent eligibility wrongly equates all claims 
directed to natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products," even though 
natural complexity shows that such terms encompass a wide variety of 
concepts. Second, the difficulties in defining such terms have led the 
Supreme Court to marginalize patent claim language. And third, the 
vagueness of what constitutes natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products" 
has had an impermissible technology-specific effect for molecular biology. 
201. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 160, at 24. 
202. Paul Humphreys, Emergence, Not Supervenience, 64 PHIL. SCI. 5337, 5344 (1997) 
(describing the spontaneous symmetry breaking of ferromagnets below Curie temperatures as 
an example of emergent phenomena). 
203. DUPRE, supra note 162, at 206. 
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A. FALSE EQUNALENCY 
The current doctrine of patent eligibility falsely equates all "laws of 
nature," "natural phenomena," and "products of nature," irrespective of 
their individual content.·04 Any patent claim that encompasses one of these 
identities is rendered ineligible.2°5 Thus, a court would treat a claim 
encompassing wide-ranging, almost universal natural "laws," such as mass-
energy equivalence, identically to highly irreproducible and narrow data 
from clinical trialS.2°6 Over time, the Supreme Court has given several 
justifications for this equivalency: that treating all natural "laws," 
"phenomena," and "products" the same is cognitively simpler; that all such 
claims monopolize knowledge about the natural world-a normatively 
undesirable result; and that such patents, by way of stare decisis, are not 
"Discoveries" for the Constitution's purposes. Given that natural complexity 
complicates precise definitions of natural "laws," "phenomena," and 
"products," this calls for a critical re-examination of the Court's 
justifications. 
First, the Court has expressly declined to draw distinctions among 
different natural "laws" or "phenomena" because, among other reasons, 
"[c]ourts and judges are not institutionally well suited to making the kinds 
of judgments needed to distinguish among different laws of nature,"·07 
paralleling other areas of the Court's scientifically cautious jurisprudence.208 
According to the Court, this counsels in favor of "a bright-line prohibition 
against patenting laws of nature" because it "serves as a somewhat more 
easily administered proxy."·09 This is not atypical: other areas of patent law 
have long favored bright-line rules as proxies for cognitive simplicity.2l0 But 
in the patent eligibility context, such favor glosses over the predicate 
204. Mayo Collaborative SeIVS. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012) 
("[O]ur cases have not distinguished among different laws of nature according to whether or 
not the principles they embody are sufficiently narrow."). 
205. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) ("The Court's precedents provide three 
specific exceptions to § 101 's broad patent-eligibility principles: 'laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.'" (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 
(1980»). 
206. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297 (comparing Einstein's famous equation, E=mc', to the 
conclusions derived from the clinical trial data at issue in the patent claims and holding the 
claim invalid); see also John P .A. Ioannidis, Contradicted and Initially Stronger Effects in Highly Cited 
Clinical Research, 294 JAMA 218, 218 (2005) (discussing the difficulties in reproducing and 
drawing definitive conclusions from most clinical trials). 
207. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. 
208. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 (1997) (Breyer, j., concurring) 
(" Ul udges are not scientists and do not have the scientific training that can facilitate the 
making of [scientific] decisions .... [W]hen law and science intersect, those duties often must 
be exercised with special care."). 
209. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. 
210. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE LJ. 2, 34-35 (2010) 
(discussing the use of a bright-line rule in the context of prosecution history estoppel). 
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question of whether it is cognitively simple to discern natural "laws," 
"phenomena," or "products" in the first instance-something that natural 
complexity suggests is not. Indeed, the difficulties with some of the 
traditional issues associated with natural "laws" and "phenomena"-
constancy, causality, probabilism, and fundamentalism-even independent 
of natural complexity cast doubt on the Court's rationale that its refusal to 
distinguish among natural "laws" and "phenomena" is due to cognitive 
simplicity.211 
Second, the Court has recently expressed its belief that allowing any 
patents encompassing natural "laws," "phenomena," or "products" "will 
inhibit future innovation premised upon them,"212 by"preempt[ing] the use 
of a natural law" in research.' 13 Thus, while "the underlying functional 
concern here is a relative one: how much future innovation is foreclosed 
relative to the contribution of the inventor," a "narrow law of nature ... can 
[still] inhibit future research."'14 But if natural "laws" or "phenomena" have 
little inherent content or are not "laws" or "phenomena" in the traditional 
sense (as natural complexity would suggest), research preemption should be 
of significantly less concern. The natural "laws" at issue in Mayo, for 
example, concerned blood concentrations of drug metabolites as derived 
from clinical study data.'15 And the Court recognized that the "naturalness" 
of the gene sequences at issue in Myriad was a fiction: "[T] here is no 'typical' 
gene because nucleotide sequences vary between individuals, sometimes 
dramatically."'16 These putative "laws" suffer from the various complications 
natural complexity imposed: they were neither constant nor causal; they 
were based on probabilistic inference; and they were not "fundamental" in 
any sense of the word. In fact, the clinical data incorporated into the Mayo 
patents' specifications suggested that the "law" claimed in those patents 
211. See Sichelman, supra note 9, at 10 ("This tension is exacerbated by current judicial and 
Patent Office practice, which-in order to keep the administrative costs of gatekeeping low-
tend to draw bright lines to demarcate areas of patentable subject matter from non-patentable 
subject matter. These practices remove the flexibility that a more policy-<lriven approach 
requires, and introduces more than a modicum of arbitrariness in many cases. Of course, these 
concerns raise the specter of the old rules-standards debate-which are often difficult to answer 
without concerted empirical analysis-but in a legal field with rapid change, rigid rules often 
seem out of place."). 
212. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301. 
213. Id.atI294· 
214. Id. at 1303; accord Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (rejecting a "patent 
[on] risk hedging [because itl would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would 
effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea"); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) 
(quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972)); Benson, 409 U.S. at 72 (concluding 
that the patent "would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would 
be a patent on the algorithm itself"). 
215. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295. 
216. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2112 n.1 
(201 3). 
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applied to less than half of patients.2I7 This would presumably leave 
researchers free to challenge the veracity of the "law" in a variety of contexts, 
or make practical use of it for those situations falling outside of the 
specifications' clinical data, rather than meaningfully preempting research 
in any way. True concerns about preemption, therefore, counsel in favor of 
making individualized determinations about the exclusionary scope of 
natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products" rather than the Court's 
current per se exclusionary ruleyS 
And third, the Court suggests that stare decisis compels it to forbid all 
claims concerning natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products" because its 
"cases have not distinguished among different laws of nature according to 
whether or not the principles they embody are sufficiently narrow."2lg But, 
in other areas, the Court has acknowledged that stare decisis carries less 
force if "facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have 
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification."22o The 
relatively recent scientific and philosophical recognition of natural 
complexity, and its effect on terms like natural "laws," "phenomena," and 
"products," seem like precisely the sort of facts, seen so differently, as to rob 
older conceptions of patent eligibility's "natural" terms of their reasonable 
application. When patent eligibility concerned itself with "principles" and 
"abstractions," a uniform exclusionary rule may have had its justifications. 
But given natural complexity's effect on these terms, the Court's own 
jurisprudence on stare decisis favors abandoning its reliance on past 
uniformity. 
B. MARGINAU7ATION OF CLAIM LANGUAGE 
Because "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or 
apply laws of nature, [or] natural phenomena,"22' the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly made clear that claims are not patent ineligible simply if they 
217. See U.s. Patent No. 6,355,623 B2 col. 17 II. 1(}-22 (filed Apr. 8, 1999) (tabulating the 
claimed dosage ranges only for patients that initially responded to drug therapy and had a drug 
metabolism that fell within specified ranges-45 out of 107 subjects). 
218. See Strandburg, supra note 3, at 587-91 (criticizing per se exclusion in patentable 
subject matter's preemption rationale). 
219. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303; accord Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 ("[T]hese exceptions have 
defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years .... 
[as] 'part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men ... free to all men and reserved exclusively 
to none.'" (second ellipses in original) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 
U.S. 127, 130 (1948»). 
220. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (citing Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting»; accord Am. 
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 302 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
("Significantly changed circumstances can make an older rule, defensible when formulated, 
inappropriate .... "). 
221. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. 
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contain natural "laws" or "phenomena."222 Rather, the doctrine of patent 
eligibility only excludes claims that encompass natural "laws" or 
"phenomena," or "simply state the law of nature while adding the words 
'apply it."'223 In drawing this distinction, a patent's claim language-the 
precise verbiage used in a patent's claims-has long been thought to be "of 
primary importance"224 because claim language does not simply describe the 
invention, but "define[s] and circumscribe[s]" the invention itself.225 
Natural complexity, however, makes defining what a natural "law" or 
"phenomena" is in the first instance increasingly difficult. As a result, the 
Court has had trouble parsing claim language into separate "elements"226 to 
determine whether claims read on natural "laws" or "phenomena" 
themselves or whether they simply "use, reflect, rest upon, or apply" those 
"laws" or "phenomena. "227 
In response to its troubles parsing claim language, the Court has 
marginalized, and in some cases, entirely discounted, the importance of 
claim language precision. It has, instead, adopted a variety of proxies to 
ascertain whether "the invention" reads on natural "laws," "phenomena," or 
"products"-even though there is no concept of "the invention" apart from 
222. [d. ("[A] process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature or a 
mathematical algorithm." (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
223. [d. at 1294 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972)). 
224. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568,570 (1876); see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 ("Our 
conclusion rests upon an examination of the particular claims before us in light of the Court's 
precedents.") . 
225. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Claims 
define the subject matter that, after examination, has been found to meet the statutory 
requirements for a patent. Their principal function, therefore, is to provide notice of the 
boundaries of the right to exclude and to define limits; it is not to describe the invention, 
although their original language contributes to the description and in certain cases satisfies it. 
Claims define and circumscribe, the written description discloses and teaches." (citation 
omitted)). But see Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. 
REv. 1, 7-8 (2012) (rejecting this view on historical grounds as a "cult"). 
226. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533 n.9 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987) ("Because claims are composed ofa number of limitations, the limitations have on 
occasion been referred to as 'claim elements' or 'elements of the claim' .... "). 
227. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293; see also id. at 1294 ("[A] process that focuses upon the use of 
a natural law [must] also contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes 
referred to as an 'inventive concept,' sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself." (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 
584,594 (1978))); Bilski v. Kappas, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) ("Diehremphasized the need 
to consider the invention as a whole, rather than 'dissect[ing] the claims into old and new 
elements and then ... ignor[ing] the presence of the old elements in the analysis.'" (alterations 
in original) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188)); Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 n.12 ("[T]he Court [has] 
upheld a patent on an improvement on a papermaking machine that made use of the law of 
gravity to enhance the flow of the product. The patentee, of course, did not claim to have 
discovered the force of gravity, but that force was an element in his novel conception."). 
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the patent's claims.··s Notably, as in Diehr, the Court resorted to reading the 
claims "as a whole."··g Where the claims, "as a whole," were directed to "a 
function which the patent laws were designed to protect," the application is 
eligible.·30 Where, "as a whole," they are not, "a competent draftsman 
[could] evade the recognized limitations on the type of subject matter 
eligible for patent protection."·3 1 
Similarly, in Mayo, the Court repeatedly referred to the "inventive 
concept" of the patent independent of the patent's precise claim 
language.·3' This allowed the Court to elide over the precise claim language 
at issue by turning patent eligibility into a quantitative rather than qualitative 
inquiry: "[D]o the patent claims add enough to their statements of the 
correlations to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible 
processes that apply natural laws?"'33 In the Court's words, patent claims 
making use of "laws of nature" are not patent eligible "unless that process 
has additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is 
228. SeeAro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344-45 (1961) 
("[It is a] basic fallacy ... [to] require [ ] the ascribing to one element of the patented 
combination the status of patented invention in itself. ... [T]his Court has made it clear ... 
that there is no legally recognizable or protected 'essential' element, 'gist' or 'heart' of the 
invention .... "); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F·3d 1369, 1372 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, j., dissenting) ("The error in Retractable is the majority's attempt to 
rewrite the claims to better conform to what it discerns is the 'invention' of the patent instead 
of construing the language of the claim."); Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 
F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("The words of the claims define the scope of the patented 
invention." (emphasis added) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 
(Fed. Cir. 1996»); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("We find 
the district court's concern with 'what the invention is' misplaced .... 'The invention' is 
defined by the claims on appeal."). 
229. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 ("[I]f the computer use incorporated in the process patent 
significantly lessens the possibility of 'overcuring' or 'undercuring,' the process as a whole does 
not thereby become unpatentable subject matter." (emphasis added»; id. at 188 ("In 
determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed process for patent protection under § 101, 
their claims must be considered as a whole." (emphasis added»; id. at 192 ("On the other hand, 
when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a 
structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the 
patent laws were designed to protect ... then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 10 1.» 
(emphasis added»; id. at 193 n.15 ("The fact that one or more of the steps in respondents' 
process may not, in isolation, be novel or independently eligible for patent protection is 
irrelevant to the question of whether the claims as a whole recite subject matter eligible for patent 
protection under § 101." (first emphasis added». 
230. Id.atI92. 
231. Id. 
232. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 ("[A] process that focuses upon the use of a natural law 
[must] also contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an 
'inventive concept,' sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more 
than a patent upon the natural law itself." (emphasis added) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 594»; 
id. at 1299 (" [P]utting the formula to the side [in Flook] there was no 'inventive concept' in the 
claimed application of the formula." (emphasis added) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 594». 
233. Id. at 1297. 
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more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature 
itself."'34 
In other instances, the Court has simply belittled the significance of 
claim language. In Flook, for example, the Court criticized the use of claim 
language in the eligibility determinations as "the draftsman's art [that] 
would ill serve the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for 
'ideas' or phenomena of nature."'35 "A competent draftsman could attach 
some form of post-solution activity to almost any mathematical formula," the 
Court declared.'36 The Court has since repeated this "draftsman" epithet in 
almost every one of its patent eligibility cases. '37 
The Court's decision in Myriad may initially appear as an exception to 
its diminishment of claim language,238 In invalidating Myriad's composition 
claims directed to molecules of DNA, the Court noted that "Myriad's claims 
are simply not expressed in terms of chemical composition, nor do they rely 
in any way on the chemical changes that result from the isolation of a 
particular section of DNA. Instead, the claims understandably focus on the 
genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. "'39 But this 
brief allusion to claim language factored little in the Court's decision 
separating isolated genomic DNA from cDNA. Indeed, the actual claim 
language for both classes of DNA was remarkably similar: both expressed 
themselves as limited to an "isolated DNA."240 The Court's effort in Myriad 
does less to parse claim language as the determinant of patent eligibility 
than it uses claim language as a cover to decide what is and is not "natural." 
Ultimately, this denigration of claim language has made claim drafting 
increasingly problematic,24 1 Without guidance as to what constitutes a 
natural "law," "phenomena," or "product," patent practitioners have few 
234. [d. 
235· Flook, 437 U.S. at 593. 
236. [d. at 590. 
237. E.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 ("[C]ases warn us against interpreting patent statutes in 
ways that make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the draftsman's art' without reference to 
the 'principles underlying the prohibition against patents for [natural laws].'" (alteration in 
original) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 593»; Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 
Inc., 548 U.S. 124,137 (2006) (Breyer,]., dissenting) ("[Diehr] warn[s] against 'allow[ing] a 
competent draftsman to evade the recognized limitations on the type of subject matter eligible 
for patent protection.'" (third alteration in original) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
192 (1981 »). 
238. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2118 
(201 3). 
239. [d. 
240. See id. at 2113. 
241. . See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of 
DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY LJ. 783, 785 (2000) ("The standard patent lawyer's response to the 
'products of nature' limitation is to treat it as a technical, claim-drafting problem."). 
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ways to assess whether a claim element constitutes one.242 And even with 
such guidance, patent practitioners are left with "no definitive answer on 
what additional elements/steps would be sufficient to ensure that a natural 
phenomena would have a practical application that would be patentable."243 
Patent practitioners must therefore cope with a field where "esoteric terms 
of art are simply indispensable" but where "the inherent complexity of 
technology, the limitations of language, and the doctrinal standard for 
evaluating patents" provide little concrete measure as to how to assess such 
terms for eligibility.244 Now, "[t]he diversity and dizzying complexity of 
contemporary innovation, the broader reach of patentable subject matter, 
and the brisker pace of technological advancement render prescient claim 
drafting an ideal far more difficult to achieve today."245 
C. TECHNOLOGy-SPECIFIC EJiJ.ECTS 
Patent law has long prided itself on being "technology-neutral"; it 
generally does not set different rules for inventions in different areas of 
technology.246 Relatively few legal doctrines turn on the class of technology 
sought to be patented, and even fewer statutory provisions distinguish 
among technologies.247 The Federal Circuit has noted that this "accords the 
same treatment to all forms of invention."248 This principle of technological 
neutrality is further embodied in the watershed international agreement on 
patents, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights ("TRIPS").249 Article 27(1) of TRIPS requires signatories to confirm 
that "patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or 
242. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03[2] [fl [ix] (2013) ("The three 
determinations for implementing [Mayo] are as follows. First, one determines whether a claim 
is drawn to a law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea .... The first weak point is the 
Court's failure to define what constitutes a 'law of nature.' The absence of a definition is 
reflected in the Court's rather summary determination that the claims at issue did involve such 
a 'law of nature.'''). 
243. 2 JOHN GLADSTONE MIllS III ET AL., PATENT LAw FUNDAMENTALS § 7+50 (2d ed. 
201 3). 
244. Lee, supra note 210, at 19-20. 
245. John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman 
Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARKL. REv. 153, 166 (2005). 
246. But see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley. Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575, 
1675-95 (2003) (arguing that, normatively, courts should use "policy levers" to adopt 
technological specificity in some fields of an). 
247. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. LJ. 1155, 1156 (2002) ("Patent law has a general set oflegal rules to govern the validity 
and infringement of patents in a wide variety of technologies. With very few exceptions, the 
statute does not distinguish between different technologies in setting and applying legal 
standards.") . 
248. Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
249. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299; see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. NO.1 03-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
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processes, in all fields of technology."'50 Ideally, the normative purpose of 
the rule is fOIWard-looking: it ensures that patent eligibility can "adapt 
flexibly to new technologies," without waiting for the laborious legislative 
process to unwind itself each time a pioneering technology seeks patent 
protection.'51 In this sense, U.S. patent law is "a unified patent system that 
provides technology-neutral protection to all kinds of technologies."25' 
Technologically-neutral language, however, can have technologically 
specific application.'53 Although the difficulties natural complexity imparts 
on patent eligibility's "natural" terms would appear to apply across multiple 
fields, the Court has, in practice, only applied them in the biotechnology 
context. Indeed, every Supreme Court decision to substantively address 
arguments that a patent claimed a "law of nature" or a "natural phenomena" 
(as opposed to an "abstract idea") has concerned patents in the 
biotechnology space. Funk Brothers concerned the patenting of bacterial 
inoculants;'54 Chakrabarty, recombinant bacteria;'55 Mayo, medical diagnostic 
tests;'56 and Myriad, human genes.'57 Even Laboratory Corp.-a dissent from a 
dismissal of an improperly granted writ-concerned biotechnology.'58 This 
biotechnology-specific effect has also been generally true of the Federal 
Circuit and its predecessor court, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals.'59 Exceptions have been rare.·50 
250. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 249, 
art. 27(1), at 331. 
251. Burk & Lemley, supra note 247, at 1156; id. at 1158 ("Congress cannot enact a new 
form of intellectual property statute each time a new technology arises."). 
252. [d. at 1156. 
253. See generally id. (documenting how courts apply the non obviousness standard 
differently between biotechnology and software patents). 
254. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 129 (1948). 
255· Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). 
256. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1291 (2012). 
257. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
258. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) 
(Breyer,]. dissenting) (concerning medical diagnostic tests). 
259. E.g., Perkin Elmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 Fed. App'x 65, 66 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(screening for Down's syndrome); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F'3d 
1057, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (immunization schedule for chronic immune-mediated disorders); 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. ].E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(seeds for hybrid com), affd, 534 U.S. 124 (2001); Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 969 
(C.C.P.A. 1979) (bacteria), vacated in part sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 
(1980); Application of Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 939 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (hormones); see also Animal 
Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 922-23 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (addressing whether 
PTO's "interpretative rule" that "non naturally occurring non-human multicellular living 
organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject matter" under § 10 I, fell under the 
Administrative Procedure Act). 
260. There appears to have been only three cases where the Federal Circuit or its 
predecessor court has described a property of a patented invention as a "law of nature" or 
"natural phenomena" outside of the biotechnology context. EMI Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress 
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Meanwhile, patents in other technologies have avoided being labeled as 
"laws of nature," "natural phenomena," or "products of nature." Questions 
concerning the patent eligibility of mathematical algorithms--even those 
describing aspects of the natural world-have been shunted to "abstract 
ideas." Diehr, for example, turned on whether the industrial application of 
the Arrhenius equation-the influence of temperature on the rate of 
chemical reactions-was too abstract to be patented, rather than whether it 
encompassed, and wholly preempted, a "law of nature" or a "natural 
phenomenon."261 Similarly, chemical-process patents have largely evaded 
scrutiny under patent eligibility's "natural" terms since the Supreme Court's 
1966 decision in Brenner v. Manson, allowing such patents to go forward as 
long as the patentee could identify the chemical compound's specific 
utility.262 This despite the fact that chemical process patents are largely 
directed to sequential series of chemical reactions-reactions that, like the 
technology in Mayo, simply take advantage of telling a reader to make use of 
natural regularities in step-wise fashion. 263 Even nanotechnology, a field that 
largely takes advantage of rare but often naturally occurring materials' 
inherent properties, has thus far escaped scrutiny as potentially ineligible 
subject matter.·64 
This difference in how patent eligibility is applied to biotechnology is 
not because these technologies do not raise the same concerns as those in 
the biological context. The dangers in patenting the Arrhenius equation, for 
example-that the patent's claims will likely be too broad relative to their 
disclosure,·65 that doing so would inhibit further research in the equation's 
area of science,.66 and that it would monopolize a "part of the storehouse of 
Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (describing a "vapor-induced fuse 
explosion mechanism" as an inherent "law of nature"); In re Bonczyk, 10 F. App'x 908, 911 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (calling "energy" a "natural phenomenon"); In re Arnold, 185 F.2d 686, 691 
(C.C.P.A. 1950) (characterizing the ideal frequency used in electrostatic fusion as a 
"phenomenon of nature"). 
261. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981); see Laidler, supra note 125, at 494 
(describing the Arrhenius equation). 
262. Brennerv. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-36 (1966). 
263. Cf Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012) 
("For these reasons we believe that the steps are not sufficient to transform unpatentable 
natural correlations into patentable applications of those regularities."). 
264. See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REv. 601, 613-14 (2005) 
(describing nanotechnology patents and stating that there is "no question about patentable 
subject matter"); see also U.S. Patent No. 6,689,674 B2 (filed May 7,2002) (claiming a method 
for fabricating nanotubes by using a nanoparticle catalyst to assemble itself on a matrix). 
265. Cf Lemley et aI., supra note 3, at 1317 (equating patent law's prohibition on "abstract 
ideas" to a concern with preventing overbroad claims). 
266. Cf Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 ("At the same time, upholding the patents would risk 
disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their use in the 
making offurther discoveries."). 
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knowledge of all men,"267- parallel those raised in Funk Brothers, Mayo, and 
Myriad. Nor does this biotechnology-specific effect mean that non biological 
inventions are any less "natural" in principle. It is also surely not because 
nonbiological inventions are somehow less affected by natural complexity 
than their biological counterparts. 26B Rather, it simply seems that courts have 
had more difficulty struggling with patent eligibility's "vague and malleable 
terms infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation"269 in some 
scientific contexts rather than others. 
IV. SIMPLIFYING PATENT EUGIBIUlY 
A. PATENT ELICIBILI1Y'S COMPLEXI1Y 
Despite the problems natural complexity poses for using patent 
eligibility'S "natural" terms, the Supreme Court seems to be obstinate in 
using them. And recent opportunities for the Court to provide a legalistic 
framework to patent eligibility, such as Bilski, Mayo, and Myriad, have done 
little more than promote the doctrine's "subjective and empty words."27° 
Scholars' proposals to provide workarounds to using the terms have gained, 
unfortunately, little traction.27 1 And Congress, even in its most recent 
overhaul of the patent statute-the most significant in sixty years-has 
abdicated responsibility.272 Any realistic solution to the riddle of patent 
eligibility'S "natural" terms must take these limits into account. Calls to 
reform patent eligibility by eliminating or circumventing the doctrine or 
calls asking for Congress or the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") to 
step in have failed before; there is good reason to believe they will fail 
267. Cf Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218. 3225 (2010) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948» (internal quotation marks omitted). 
268. But see Burk & Lemley, supra note 246, at 1676 ("Biotechnology products arise out of 
living systems and are typically intended to interact with other human or nonhuman living 
systems. Such interactions, whether physiological or ecological, are enonnously complex and 
the systems involved are poorly characterized."). 
26g. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 135 (Frankfurter,]., concurring). 
270. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F'3d 126g, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, CJ., 
additional reflections) ("I enjoy good writing and a good mystery, but I doubt that innovation is 
promoted when subjective and empty words like 'contribution' or 'inventiveness' are offered up 
by the courts to detennine investment, resource allocation, and business decisions."), eert. 
granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3131 (Dec. 6, 2013) (No. 13-2g8). 
271. See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 3 (not cited by any cases); Crouch & Merges, supra note 3 
(cited by CLS Bank, although not followed); Eisenberg, supra note 3 (cited by Mayo, although 
not followed); Golden, supra note 3 (not cited by any cases); Kane, supra note 3 (not cited by 
any cases); Risch, supra note 3 (explicitly rejected by Mayo); Strandburg, supra note 3 (not cited 
by any cases). But see Lemley et aI., supra note 3 (cited by Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301-02, for the 
proposition that the doctrine of patent eligibility concerns whether the invention "forecloses 
more future invention than the underlying discovery could reasonably justifY"). 
272. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-2g, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(failing to amend § 10 I ). 
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again.273 But, as this Article seeks to demonstrate, any attempt to provide 
more concrete definitions to patent eligibility's "natural" terms is also bound 
to fail. "Natural laws," "phenomena," and "products" are, at this point, too 
bound up in confusing and contradictory Supreme Court precedent, and 
too infected with the vagaries of natural complexity, to be clearly resolved. 
In this way, and like the science it attempts to assess, the doctrine of 
patent eligibility has itself "complexified." Relative to its predecessor 150 
years ago, patent eligibility must now concern itself with more elements: 
more technologies, more patents, more claims, and more precedent.274 
These elements have also increased in variety: more diverse technologies, 
more types of patents, more classes of claims, and more administrative 
procedures to challenge them.275 And the number of interrelationships 
between these elements has similarly increased.276 
This recognition that patent eligibility is, itself, complex provides an 
important foundation for reform. Indeed, this suggests that patent eligibility 
would tend to benefit from other successful approaches "involve[d in] the 
consideration of a most complexly organized whole."277 Like traditional legal 
analyses, scientific approaches to natural complexity have long relied upon 
methods of "collection, description, classification, and the observation of 
concurrent and apparently correlated effects."278 And, like the law, science 
has called upon several familiar legal tropes to accomplish its tasks: 
"weighing evidence; ... deciding what is relevant and what is not; ... [and] 
finding, interpreting, and facing facts."279 Borrowing science's strategies to 
accomplish its goals may therefore be useful strategies for patent eligibility'. 
273. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) ("The choice [on 
patentable subject matter] we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution within 
the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative 
bodies can provide and courts cannot. ... Whatever their validity, the contentions now pressed 
on us should be addressed to the political branches of the Government, the Congress and the 
Executive, and not to the courts."); Crouch & Merges. supra ~ote 3. at 1683-91 (asking courts 
to address patent eligibility last in an effort to avoid difficult eligibility determinations); Golden. 
supra note 3, at 1041 ("[T]he enterprise of regulating patentable subject matter should be 
primarily entrusted to the USPTO, rather than, as it is now, to the courts."); Risch, supra note 3. 
at 598-609 (advocating for the elimination of patent eligibility by using other areas of the 
patent statute). 
To be clear: this is not to say that these proposals were not good, or that they would not 
have worked had they been implemented. This is only to say that these proposals have little 
chance of actually being adopted. 
274. See Josh Lerner, 150 Years of Patent Office Practice, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 112 (2005); 
Josh Lerner, 150 Years of Patent Protection, 92 AM. ECON. REv. 221 (2002). 
275. See sources cited supra note 274. 
276. See Allison & Lemley. supra note 24. at 104-25 (describing. empirically. the 
interrelationships among these characteristics). 
277. Weaver, supra note 17, at 536. 
278. [d. at 536--37. 
279. [d. at 542. 
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B. DECOMPOSITION AND LOCAlJ7A TION AS STRA TEGIES FOR NA TURAL COMPLEXITY 
In the sciences, the problem of describing complex interactions is often 
solved through the twin processes of "decomposition and localization."280 
Decomposition concerns breaking down a complex system into subparts-
"the subdivision of the explanatory task so that the task becomes 
manageable and the system intelligible."281 In physics, for example, this may 
concern decomposing a particular phenomenon into subatomic particles.282 
Neurobiologists often decompose the brain into separate neural 
structures. 283 And, in molecular biology, decomposition concerns breaking 
down physiology into cells, proteins, or genes.284 Decomposition is the 
strategy of "divide and conquer." 
Localization concerns identifying the function or functions of each 
subpart; "the identification of the different activities proposed in a task 
decomposition with the behavior or capacities of specific components."285 
That is, it attempts to "localize" one or more properties of the complex 
system to the behavior of one or more subparts. In neurobiology, for 
example, a portion of the left frontal cortex is responsible for producing 
speech, although not responsible for comprehending it.286 Localization is, 
essentially, mapping a function of a system to one of its components. 
Together, decomposition and localization allow one to develop a 
"mechanistic" explanation of a complex system.287 
Harnessing decomposition and localization as strategies in simplifying 
complex problems first requires an understanding of where to begin. To 
that end, "[b]efore it is possible, or even relevant, to develop a fully 
mechanistic explanation of how a system performs some function ... it is 
necessary to identify what functions are performed and what system performs 
these functions."288 This can be termed "isolating the locus of control."28g In 
280. See generally BECHTEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 25 (describing decomposition and 
localization in scientific practice). 
281. Id. at 23. 
282. William Bechtel, Reducing Psychology While Maintaining Its Autonomy via Mechanistic 
Explanations, in THE MATTER OF THE MIND: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY, 
NEUROSCIENCE, AND REDUCTION 172, 178 (Maurice Schouten & Huib Looren de Jong eds., 
2007) (describing decomposition in physics). 
283. Tadeusz Zawidzki & William Bechtel, Gall's Legacy Revisited: Decomposition and 
Localization in Cognitive Neuroscience, in THE MIND AS A SCIENTIFIC OBJECT: BETWEEN BRAIN AND 
CULTURE 293, 293 (Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson eds., 2005). 
284. Fred C. Boogerd et aI., Mechanistic Explanations and Models in Molecular Systems Biology, 
18 FOUND. SCI. 725 (2013). 
285. BECIITEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 24. 
286. See Zawidzki & Bechtel, supra note 283, at 298-99 (discussing localization in the 
context of Broca's and Wernicke's areas). 
287. BECHTEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 17-23. 
288. Id. at 35. 
289. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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some instances, "[f1inding the right system is often difficult."290 But in 
others, "nature seems to divide naturally into systems."291 As such, identifying 
the locus of control of any particular system is, often, a dynamic product of 
trial and error.292 
The question, "How does a car move?" serves as a good example of 
decomposition and localization in practice. As an initial matter, one should 
recognize that the question is deceptively complex. The internal combustion 
engine is not famous for being simple.293 Aside from the complexity of the 
engine, moving from point A to point B is contingent on many variable, 
interdependent parts: the wheels, the engine, the drivetrain, the gasoline, 
and, of course, the driver. All must be present and all must act in concert for 
the car to move at all. Nonetheless, in asking how the car physically moves, 
we can begin by isolating the locus of control by separating the system into 
car and driver. Here, the system that is moving is the car itself, rather than 
the driver, alone. (The driver is surely responsible for starting and operating 
the car, but it is the car that moves the driver, not the other way around.) 
Once this is identified, we can decompose the car into various 
components-the engine, the drivetrain, and the wheels, for instance. We 
can then localize each component to a particular function of the system: the 
engine is powered by gasoline and powers the drivetrain, the drivetrain 
powers the wheels, and so on. And from there, we can generalize these 
functions to a mechanistic description of the car's movement: it converts the 
chemical energy of the gasoline into mechanical energy that moves the 
wheels.294 
To be sure, decomposition and localization as strategies for simplifying 
complex phenomena has its limits. The appearance of emergent properties 
of complex systems-the behavior of which does not appear to be controlled 
by any particular mechanism of the individual, underlying components-
makes decomposition and localization particularly difficult.295 For truly 
emergent phenomena, where "the parts do not seem to be performing 
intelligible subtasks contributing to the overall task ... decomposition and 
localization ... fall short."296 Similarly, where the functions of a system solely 
290. [d. at 39. 
291. [d. 
292. See id. at 40 ("In most domains of inquiry, such recognition evolves with time and 
research as scientists develop conceptual frameworks to determine a particular way of 
decomposing nature into systems. "). 
293. See 2 CHARLES FAYETIE TAYLOR, THE INTERNAL-COMBUSTION ENGINE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE: COMBUSTION, fuELS, MATERIALS, DESIGN 423 (rev. ed. 1985) ("The subject of detail 
design of a machine so complex as an engine would require much more space than is available 
here and could easily fill several volumes if covered in a thorough manner."). 
294. See BECHTEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 39 (giving a car as an example of 
decomposition and localization). 
295. Id. at 202-03· 
296. Id. at 203. 
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depend on the connections between elements, rather than any individual 
properties of its separate components, we should be counseled to 
"abandon [J decomposition and localization."297 Nonetheless, decomposition 
and localization have historically solved a broad variety of complex scientific 
problems, including those in cellular respiration,298 fermentation,299 and 
biochemical genetics.30o Even if decomposition and localization fail in 
simplifying mechanistic explanations to complex phenomena, "they may 
serve as probative tools for facilitating discovery."301 
C. A MECHANISTIC DESCRIPTION OF PATENT EUGIBIliTY 
Decomposition and localization appear to be especially apt strategies 
for solving the patent eligibility puzzle. Rather than rely on "a largely 
meaningless 'litany' recited before 'the Court... chooses up sides and 
decides the case,'"302 decomposition and localization provide an avenue to 
mechanistically describe which particular factors actually control the Court's 
patent eligibility jurisprudence.303 This description should remand patent 
eligibility inquiries from high levels of abstraction-What is a "law of 
nature"?-to more concrete, narrower questions. These narrower questions, 
built into a "multi prong" or "multifactor" analysis, can provide a legalistic, 
descriptive test that harmonizes and explains the Court's past precedent 
while moving away from the vagaries of natural "laws," "phenomena," and 
"products." This analytical approach to patent eligibility should be 
cognitively easier than the current state of affairs.304 
This strategy of replacing standards' reliance on "subjective and empty 
words"30 5 with narrower questions of application has proved successful 
elsewhere in the law. For example, the Constitution's requirement that 
federal courts hear only "cases or controversies"-the meanings of which 
have been debated since Ratification-is now assessed through a robust 
297· Id. at 222-23. 
298. Id. at 72-88. 
299· Id. at 153-68. 
300. Id. at 173-92. 
30 1. Id. at 243. 
302. Cf Fletcher, supra note 26, at 221 (alteration in original) (discussing a similar 
problem regarding standing); see also id. at 290 ("The solution ... is ... to break down what 
might appear to be a single, general question into discrete and particular questions."). 
303. Cf BECHTEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 17-23 (identifying the goal of 
decomposition and localization as providing mechanistic explanations of complex systems). 
304. See id. at 23 (describing decomposition as "the subdivision of the explanatory task so 
that the task becomes manageable and the system intelligible"); Fletcher, supra note 26, at 290 
("As Justice Iredell wrote in 1793 in his great dissent in Chisholm v. Gemgia: 'I have often found 
a great deal of confusion to arise from taking too large a view at once ... .' The solution for 
Iredell was (as it is here) to break down what might appear to be a single, general question into 
discrete and particular questions." (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted». 
305. Cf CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader,]., 
additional reflections) (criticizing patent eligibility's continued reliance on such terms). 
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analytical framework.306 Similarly, the Constitution's prohibition on "cruel 
and unusual" punishments incorporates familiar and well-worn common law 
standards.307 And personal jurisdiction's call for "fair play and substantial 
justice"-truly subjective and empty terms, if there ever were ones-has 
since been parceled into several objective factors.308 Indeed, this approach 
of pruning increasingly gnarly jurisprudence into cleaner branches "is as 
time-honored in law as the striving for generality."309 Patent eligibility-
which continues to reference lists of philosophically pregnant conceits, such 
as whether gravity is, in fact, a "natural law"-is ripe for a similar 
trimming.310 
Ideally, any such breakdown would avoid the hopelessly undefinable 
terms "laws of nature," "natural phenomena," and "products of nature," and 
replace them with a standard that is both objective and clear. Constructed 
properly, such an analysis could also overcome the difficulties complexity 
generally imparts on the doctrine of patent eligibility by allowing for nuance 
among marginal eligibility cases, respecting claim language, and eliminating 
technological bias.311 Breaking down patent eligibility into cognitively 
simple-and concrete-subparts is also both politically and judicially viable: 
it requires neither the intervention of Congress nor a radical shift in 
jurisprudence, something for which the Supreme Court has expressed its 
distaste.3 12 And litigants are more likely to achieve better results from courts: 
it is more like what courts typically doY3 Faced with indefinite, complex 
terms, decomposition and localization appear to be coherent, feasible 
strategies to resolving patent eligibility's "natural" terms. 
306. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC) , Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-
81 (2000) (providing an analytical framework for assessing the existence of a "case or 
controversy" under the Constitution). 
307. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1994) (incorporating the criminal law 
concept of "deliberate indifference" into defining "cruel and unusual" punishment). 
308. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (analyzing "fair 
play and substantial justice" as including "the burden on the defendant, the interests of the 
forum State, and the plaintifTs interest in obtaining relief"). 
309. Fletcher, supra note 26, at 290. 
310. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 122, at 56-59 (discussing gravity); DUPRE, supra note 162, 
at 185-87 (same). 
31 1. See supra Part III. 
312. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012) 
(refusing to jettison § 101 in favor of other statutory requirements because "[tlhe approach is 
... not consistent with prior law. The relevant cases rest their holdings upon section 101, not 
later sections"). 
313. See id. (describing how courts and judges are poorly suited to address questions of 
scientific philosophy); Fletcher, supra note 26, at 290 (discussing how courts do well at breaking 
down general issues oflegaI theory into discrete questions). 
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1. Identifying the Locus of Control and Decomposing Patents 
The first step in decomposition and localization is identifying the "locus 
of control"-the aspect of the system that "carries out a transformation of 
inputs into outputs."314 While identitying a system's locus of control "is often 
difficult,"315 this is not the case for patent eligibility: the locus of control for 
patent eligibility is the patent document. It is the patent document itself-
rather than extrinsic evidence, such as scientific norms, enforcement 
policies, or market effects-that ultimately controls whether a patent 
application falls within the bounds of patentable subject matter.316 
A patent can typically be decomposed into only two components: its 
claims and its specification. Under 35 U.S.c. § 112(a), the patent must 
"contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it"-its specificationY7 The specification must 
also "conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor ... regards as the 
invention."318 A patent may also contain other elements-drawings,319 
appendices,32o and even models of the invention3 21-but these are not always 
necessary, and they are often of minor importance when interpreting the 
patent document.322 
314. BECHTEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 35. 
315. Id. at 39. 
316. This may appear to be a tautology-what controls patent eligibility depends, after all, 
on how we define it-but courts and commentators do appear to take it as a descriptive truth in 
principle, if not practice. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F·3d 1303, 1324 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) ("[Ilt is important to state what this appeal is not about. It is not about 
whether individuals ... are entitled to a second opinion. Nor is it about whether the [patenteel 
... has acted improperly in its licensing or enforcement policies with respect to the patents. 
The question is also not whether is it desirable for one company to hold a patent or license 
covering a test that may save people's lives, or for other companies to be excluded from the 
market encompassed by such a patent-that is the basic right provided by a patent, i.e., to 
exclude others from practicing the patented subject matter."), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. 
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Jeanne C. 
Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REv. 539, 554 (2009) ("[Tlhe patent document is typically 
the primary situs of information about patented inventions."). At the same time, MarkJanis and 
Timothy Holbrook have written about the practical difficulties in such clean distinctions 
between patent law's definitions and their objects. Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent 
Law's Audience, 97 MINN. L. REv. 72, 111-16 (2012). Nonetheless, Janis and Holbrook are 
"unsure whether conjuring up a different heuristic is likely to advance the law here." Id. at Ill. 
317. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
318. Id. § 112(b). 
319. Id. § 113 (2006). 
320. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,349,334 B2 col. 93-388 (filed June 30, 20 II). 
321. 35 U.S.C. § 114· 
322. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314-17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(discussing the central importance of the claims and the specification in interpreting a patent). 
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The claims and the specification serve several functions. The claims 
"alert[ ] the public of the metes and bounds of an inventor's discovery"323 or 
"the outer boundaries of the patent."3 2 4 In this way, the claims "define the 
scope of protection afforded by the patent" that, like land grants, provide 
"descriptions of lands by metes and bounds in a deed which define the area 
conveyed but do not describe the land."32 5 And, like any land grant, claims fence 
their domain from their neighbors': they "differentiate [the invention] over 
the prior art."326 The patent specification, on the other hand, "serves a 
teaching function, as a 'quid pro quo' in which the public is given 'meaningful 
disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for 
a limited period of time. "'32 7 The specification describes the land of the 
invention-it provides a general description of the invention as a whole, 
explains its contribution to the art, and lists examples of how to use the 
inventiony8 And, until recently, a patent could be invalidated for failing to 
include, in the specification, the best mode of making or using the 
inventionyg In short: "Specifications teach. Claims claim."330 
2. Localizing Patents' Components to Patent Eligibility's Goals 
The second step in decomposition and localization is to map, or 
"localize," the system's components to particular outputs of the system-
here, the ultimate patent eligibility determination.33 1 That is, how does each 
function of the claims and specification map to answer whether a particular 
claim is patent eligible? Viewing each of those functions through the lens of 
the Supreme Court's patent eligibility jurisprudence provides some insight 
323. In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 536 (Fed. Cir. 2012). But see 
Janis & Holbrook, supra note 316, at 112-16 (discussing the contradictory jurisprudence in this 
area). 
324. Mark A. Lemley, Point oJNovelty, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1253, 1272 (2011). 
325. In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
326. John Burke, The Prior An by Admission Doctrine:judiciaUy Created Private Prior An, 13 FED. 
CIR. BJ. 607, 624 (2004). 
327. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002»; see Fromer, supra 
note 316, at 594-99 (calling for a reinvigorated disclosure requirement); Sean B. Seymore, The 
Teaching Function oJPatents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 621,669 (2010) (calling for simpler patent 
disclosure to better fulfill the teaching function). But see Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in 
Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REv. 123, 131-46 (2006) (arguing that structural limitations in patent 
law minimize the teaching function). 
328. See Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme Coun's Business Method Patents 
Decision: New Directions Jor Regulating Patent Scape, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 11, 18 (2011). 
329. See generally Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, The Pseudo-Elimination oj Best Mode: 
Worst Possible Choice?, 59 UCLA L. REv. DISCOURSE 170 (2012) (discussing the legal status of the 
best mode requirement). 
330. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
331. CJ BECHTEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 35· 
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into a mechanistic description of patent eligibility apart from traditional 
assessments of its "natural" terms. 
a. Claim Scope 
The central function of patent claims is "to define the scope of protection 
afforded by the patent."33' To that end, a significant portion of the Supreme 
Court's patent eligibility jurisprudence has focused on claims that appeared 
to be so broad as to potentially cover yet undeveloped technologies, In 
Benson, for example, the Court characterized the applicants' claims as 
virtually unlimited in scope, "not limited to any particular art or technology, 
to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use."333 
Rather, the claims "purported to cover any use of the claimed method in a 
general-purpose digital computer of any type,"334 This made the claims "so 
abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD 
to pure binary conversion."335 In Flook, the Court noted that the applicant's 
claims "cover[ed] any use of [the applicant's] formula for updating the 
value of an alarm limit" in its field, which, although not expressly disclosed 
in the patent application, nonetheless "cover[ ed] a broad range of potential 
uses of the method."336 Allowing such claims to proceed, in the Court's view, 
would make "the beachhead of [the patent] privilege, .. wider, and the area 
of public use narrower" than Congress had presumably directed.337 And in 
Bilski, the Court referred to the petitioners' claims as merely "broad 
examples of how hedging can be used in commodities and energy 
markets,"338 and noted that "[i]f a high enough bar is not set when 
considering patent applications of this sort, patent examiners and courts 
could be flooded with claims that would put a chill on creative endeavor and 
dynamic change."339 
Scholars have written extensively about this concern over claim breadth 
in the Court's assessment of "abstract ideas." In one seminal article, Life After 
Bilski, Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman, and R. Polk Wagner 
argued that "the rule against patenting abstract ideas is best understood as 
an effort to prevent inventors from claiming their ideas too broadly."340 In 
another article, Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley similarly noted that "[t]he 
rule against patenting abstract ideas, while couched in terms of patentable 
332. In reVamco Mach, & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
333. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972) (emphasis added). 
334. Id. (emphasis added). 
335. [d. at 68. 
336. Parkerv. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978) (emphasis added). 
337. Id. at 596 (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 
(1972». 
338. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,3231 (2010). 
339. Id. at 3229. 
340. Lemley et aI., supra note 3, at 1317. 
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subject matter, is really a judicial effort to restrict the permissible scope of 
patents."34l Kevin Emerson Collins has explicated the nuances concerning 
abstract claim scope and abstract claim language scope.342 And Alan L. 
Durham has recognized that" [t] he scope of the claim, and its impact on the 
progress of the technological arts, is what ultimately condemns it" under § 
10l,343 Meanwhile, in the lead up to Mayo, Rebecca S. Eisenberg famously 
highlighted the diversity of these approaches.344 
Claim scope's strong effect on the Supreme Court's "abstract ideas" 
jurisprudence suggests that it likely plays a similar role in the Court's 
assessments of natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products." Indeed, claim 
scope was at the core of the Court's recent decisions in Mayo and Myriad. In 
Mayo, the Court read its prior case law concerning "abstract ideas" as 
"warn [ing] us against upholding patents that claim processes that too 
broadly preempt the use of a naturallaw."345 And paralleling its language in 
Benson, the Court construed the claims at issue in Mayo as "set[ting] forth in 
highly general language. . . all processes that make use of the correlations 
after measuring metabolites."346 Thus, although the Mayo Court struggled 
throughout its opinion to define a "natural law" in order to ground its 
decision,347 it simultaneously voiced a simpler concern over the contested 
claims' breadth as it had done in its "abstract ideas" cases. And in Myriad, the 
Court again recognized that patent eligibility was concerned with claim 
scope-"imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, 
invention"348-while simultaneously characterizing the claims as "concerned 
primarily with the information contained in the genetic sequence, not with the 
specific chemical composition of a particular molecule."349 Thus, although 
the Myriad Court rooted its decision in the "naturalness" of isolated genomic 
DNA as opposed to cDNA, it, too, expressed simpler, normative concerns 
about claim breadth. 
341. Burk & Lemley, supra note 246, at 1642. 
342. Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity, supra note 122, at 51 ("Critically-and this point is 
often overlooked-abstraction in the language used to delineate the scope of a claim can be 
independent of abstraction in the individual embodiments of an invention that are described 
by the claim language."). 
343. Alan L. Durham, The Paradox of "Abstract Ideas. "2011 UTAH L. REv. 797. 814. 
344. Eisenberg. supra note 3, at 56-61. 
345. Mayo Collaborative Sen'S. v. Prometheus Labs .• Inc .• 132 S. Ct. 1289. 1294 (2012) 
(emphasis added). 
346. Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). Compare id .• with Parker v. Flook. 437 U.S. 584. 586 
(1978) (noting that the "patent claims cover any use of [the applicant's) formula for updating 
the value of an alarm limit" (emphasis added». 
347. E.g., Mayo. 132 S. Ct. at 1297-98 (comparing physical "principles" to "laws of nature"); 
id. at 1298-99 (mathematical equations); id. at 1302 (statistical relationships). 
348. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics. Inc .• 133 S. Ct. 2107. 2116 (2013) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Mayo. 132 S. Ct. at 1305). 
349. Id. at 2118 (first emphasis added). 
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Even prior to these cases, a number of scholars noted the potential for 
claim scope to bridge "abstract ideas" and "natural laws," "phenomena," and 
"products." Tun:Jen Chiang, in particular, has argued that patent eligibility's 
prohibition on applications directed to "abstract ideas" and "laws of nature" 
"are one and the same in purpose and effect and are simply limits on the 
scope of patents."350 Similarly, Efthimios Parasidis struggled with uniformly 
combining the two doctrines, but did suggest a hybrid framework for the 
two, complete with a binary decision-tree.351 And, in Life After Bilski, Lemley, 
Risch, Sichelman, and Wagner likened "a claim to an abstract idea [to] a 
claim to a product of nature: not limited to real-world applications of 
human inventiveness, and thus ineligible for patenting."352 
At the same time, distinguishing merely broad patent claims from ones 
so broad they render themselves ineligible for patent protection remains a 
difficult task. And while precisely resolving the contours of that question 
remains outside the scope of this Article, the best proposal thus far-the one 
proposed by Lemley, Risch, Sichelman, and Wagner-has identified five 
factors important to that inquiry: the generative potential of the claimed 
invention; the nature of invention in the industry; the pace of innovation in 
the field; the number of disclosed embodiments relative to the breadth of 
the claims; and the difference between the claimed invention and the prior 
art.353 In the aftermath of Myriad, Sichelman has recently demonstrated the 
fruitfulness of applying these factors to the Court's traditional "natural" 
terms cases.354 Sichelman argued that the result in Funk Brothers, for 
example, could be explained from Varley Sherman Bond's invention's 
generative and cumulative nature: Bond's seed inoculant mixture gave rise 
to the potential of other, undisclosed noninhibitory inoculant mixtures for 
use in an industry-agriculture-famous for building innovation on old 
practices.355 Similarly, the claims in both Mayo and Myriad were predicated 
on few embodiments in the context of highly generative and rapidly 
developing technologies.356 
Localizing claim scope to patent eligibility-and away from 
philosophically troublesome attempts to define what "natural" truly means-
provides a substantially clearer and more workable understanding of the 
prohibition on patenting natural "laws," "phenomena," or "products." And it 
would appear to solve the greater problems with natural complexity'S effect 
on cabining patentable subject matter. It would not be subject to the current 
350. Chiang, supra note 3, at 1381 n.148. 
351. Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 85 TuL. L. REv. 323, 406--08 
(2010). 
352. Lemley et al., supra note 3, at 1329. 
353. [d. at 1341. 
354· Sichelman, supra note g, at 15. 
355. [d. at 15-16. 
356. [d. at 15-17. 
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false equivalency of patent eligibility-that is, that patent claims on all 
"natural laws," regardless of their scope, are ineligible-because, unlike 
asking whether a patent claim is or is not a natural law, claim scope inquiries 
are inherently spectral: the breadth of a claim is an inherently multihued 
inquiry. A focus on claim scope would also refocus patent eligibility on claim 
language, and not on unarticulated notions of "the invention as a whole," 
because such a focus would presumably pay close attention to specific claim 
language.357 And while such a focus may still cause the doctrine to suffer 
from technological specificity, a renewed concern with the patent document 
and the absence of the biologically loaded word, "Nature," counsels that 
technological specificity is at least less likely to happen. Whether, in making 
patent eligibility determinations, courts assess claim scope through the 
factors identified by Lemley, Risch, Sichelman, and Wagner, or others, any 
mechanistic description of patent eligibility should rely in part on an analysis 
of the scope of the contested claims. 
b. The Claims' and Specification'S Relationship to the Prior Art 
Both the claims and the specification serve another function: 
demarcating the invention's boundaries from the prior art.358 The 
specification in particular will often include a description of not only how to 
make and use the invention, but also why the invention is an important 
contribution in its field beyond that of previously existing innovations.35g 
While the invention's relationship with the prior art has not been 
traditionally thought of as playing an important role in determining patent 
eligibility, the Court's recent trio of cases-Bilski, Mayo, and Myriad-have 
increasingly noted patents' relationships to prior art in their respective 
fields. In Bilski, the Court noted that the patent's underlying principle-
commodities hedging-was "long prevalent in our system of commerce and 
taught in any introductory finance class."360 Far from radically reinventing 
finance, the procedure taught by the patent application was an older, "basic 
concept of ... protecting against risk."361 Furthermore, the Court noted that 
several elements of the contested claims concerning certain random analysis 
techniques were already "well-known" to practitioners.362 The claims and 
357. But see Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity, supra note 122, at 51 (arguing that the two 
inquiries can be separated). 
358. See Burke, supra note 326, at 624; Chisum, supra note 328, at 18. But see Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, ISS-91 (1981) (rejecting novelty as a consideration in § 101 
determinations) . 
359. Chisum, supra note 328, at IS. 
360. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,3231 (2010) (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F·3d 943, 
1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader,]., dissenting» (internal quotation marks omitted). 
361. Id. 
362. Id. 
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specification, therefore, did little, if anything, to distinguish the patent's 
greater contribution to the field of commodities purchasing. 
More recently, in Mayo, the Court repeatedly focused on the fact that 
the patent described "well-understood, routine, conventional activity 
previously engaged in by researchers in the field."363 According to the Court, 
the patent's direction to "determine" the particular level of a metabolite in a 
patient's blood simply "tells doctors to engage in well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity previously engaged in by scientists who work in the 
field."364 The Court analogized this to the "[p]urely 'conventional or 
obvious' '[pre]-solution activity'" at issue in Flook.36S And the Court noted 
that "any additional steps consist [ed] of well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community. "366 
These statements, too, expressed the belief that the patent-aside from 
simply claiming a "law of nature"-added nothing to the greater medical 
diagnostics field at large. 
And the Myriad Court remarked that the patented genes were extracted 
through "well known laboratory methods" and synthesized according to 
"processes similarly well known in the field of genetics."367 The Court 
specifically noted that "Myriad's patent descriptions highlight the problem 
with its claims" in that it "simply detail[ed] the 'iterative process' of [gene] 
discovery"-something well known in genetics.368 This counseled the Court 
to characterize "Myriad's principal contribution [as] uncovering the precise 
location and genetic sequence," rather than "creating" or "inventing" the 
sequences themselves.369 
These recent statements about the claims' and specification's 
relationships to their inventions' respective arts evince concern over 
granting method patents to inventions accomplished through an art's core 
operational techniques-hedging in finance, dosing in medicine, or 
sequencing in genetics. In such instances, allowing method patents to 
essentially mimic these techniques-even if the particular patented use of 
the techniques otherwise met the remaining strictures of the patent 
statute-raises the specter of monopolizing the techniques themselves. 
Distilled to a truism, claims' and specifications' prior-art demarcating 
function concerns itself more with how an invention is accomplished than 
363. Mayo Collaborative SelVS. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289. 1294 (2012). 
364. Id. at 1298. 
365. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Parker v. Flook. 437 U.S. 584. 590 
(1978)). 
366. Id. 
367. Ass'n for Molecular Pathologyv. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107. 2112 (2013). 
368. Id. at2117-18. 
369. Id. at 2116. 
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what an invention is.37° The more a patent relies on "well-understood, 
routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the 
field,"37 1 the more likely the patent will fail for ineligibility. 
To be sure, there are several problems with equating claim demarcation 
to an invention's field's core operation techniques: it greatly overlaps with 
other aspects of patentability, notably obviousness; it may discriminate 
against inventions made through trial and error rather than a "flash of 
genius," in contravention of the patent statute; and it potentially places an 
increased fact-finding burden on the PTO.372 But, like tacking claim 
language toward scope rather than "abstractness," this approach seems to 
avoid the shoals complexity threatens on interpreting natural "laws," 
"phenomena," and "products." It would seem to also avoid the false 
equivalency trap because assessing a patent's claims and specification 
relative to "well-understood" techniques in its field is not an all-or-nothing 
proposition. Such an assessment would also reorient patent eligibility to 
claim language rather than scientific philosophy. And far from promoting a 
technological bias, the inquiry would allow nuanced, field-by-field 
determinations into the invention's place in its particular art. This, too, 
would be a marked improvemen t to amorphous definitions of natural "laws," 
"phenomena," and "products." 
c. The Specification's Teaching Function 
Lastly, the specification also serves a teaching function, or as defined by 
the Federal Circuit, "a 'quid pro quo' in which the public is given 'meaningful 
disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for 
a limited period of time. "'373 The Federal Circuit's diction, namely-
"meaningful"-proves rather illuminating. While patent law's other 
requirements concerning the specification-written description and 
enablement-involve whether the specification's disclosure is sufficient 
enough to practice the invention,374 the specification's function in patent 
eligibility is tied to whether the disclosure is meaningful enough for the 
invention to receive patent protection at all. Here, too, recent patent 
eligibility litigation proves instructive. In Mayo, in particular, the Supreme 
Court repeatedly described its concern with the contested patent 
370. Jacob S. Sherkow, And How: Mayo v. Prometheus and the Method of Invention, 122 YALE 
LJ. ONLINE 351,352 (2013) ("Rather than focusing on what the invention is, [this function] 
focuses on how the invention is accomplished."). 
371. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
372. Sherkow, supra note 370, at 354-57. 
373. Vniv. of Rochester v. C.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Cen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. CiT. 2002». 
374. See 35 V.S.c. § 112(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (requiring that the specification be 
written "in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to 
which it pertains ... to make and use the same"). 
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application-and patent applications, in general-as what it presumed to 
"tell" others in the field. A fictional attempt by Albert Einstein to patent a 
process using "E=mc" in nuclear acceleration failed, in the Court's view, 
because it amounted to little more tlIan "telling linear accelerator operators 
to refer to the law to determine how much energy an amount of mass has 
produced"-a meaningless, even if enabling disclosure.375 A similar fictional 
attempt by Archimedes to patent an application of buoyancy with respect to 
shipbuilding also failed in the Court's esteem because that "consist[ed] of 
simply telling boat builders to refer to that principle in order to determine 
whether an object will float."376 Analogously, the patent application in Mayo 
failed, in part, because even tlIough the specification more than sufficiently 
enabled physicians to control drug dosage according to the patent, it did 
little more than teach users of the invention to make use of a particular 
principle in otherwise "well-understood" techniques.377 
Similarly, in Myriad, tlIe Court repeatedly referenced the shortcomings 
of Myriad's specifications-that they detailed Myriad's method of 
discovering the genes but nothing more. These disclosures described only 
"fairly uniform" approaches to making use of tlIe technology "insofar as any 
scientist engaged in the search for a gene would likely have utilized a similar 
approach. "378 
These concerns with the quality of the specification's disclosure-not 
just its sufficiency-focus on whether the specification actually fulfills its 
teaching function in a manner worthy of the societal quid pro quo for the 
patent grant-whether the disclosure is meaningful to its particular art. 
AltlIough the Mayo and Myriad Courts did not ground their decisions in 
those terms, tlIeir dicta concerning tlIe patents' specifications highlight the 
difference between specifications that teach a meaningful new way of 
implementing the claimed invention and those that simply describe variants 
on "well-understood, routine, conventional activity."379 In some ways, this 
provides an avenue to reinvigorate § 101 's statutory command that all 
patented inventions be botlI "new and useful."38o A patent specification that 
teaches neither new nor useful concepts-even if it makes use of old 
375. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297. 
376. Id. 
377. See id. ("[TJhe 'wherein' clauses simply tell a doctor about the relevant natural laws, at 
most adding a suggestion that he should take those laws into account when treating his patient. 
That is to say, these clauses tell the relevant audience about the laws while trusting them to use 
those laws appropriately where they are relevant to their decision making (rather like Einstein 
telling linear accelerator operators about his basic law and then trusting them to use it where 
relevant)."). 
378. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119-20 
(2013) (quoting Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181,203 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010». 
379. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298. 
380. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
THE NATURAL COMPLEXITY OF PATENT EliGIBIliTY llgl 
concepts in a new, useful, and nonobvious way-may, in some cases, run 
afoul of patent eligibility. This potentially demonstrates another avenue for 
localizing disclosure's teaching requirement to patent eligibility. 
3. Building a Mechanistic Description of Patent Eligibility 
The scope of the claims, the claims' and specification's relationship to 
the prior art, and the "meaningfulness" of the specification's disclosure all 
affect whether a patent application is, or is not, patent eligible. Taken 
together, these three functions describe a mechanistic view of patent 
eligibility. At these functions' extremes, the inquiry is disjunctive. If a claim's 
scope is wildly too broad, the claim will almost certainly be rendered 
ineligible under one of the traditional patent eligibility inquiries. If the 
invention, as set forth in the claims or described in the specification, 
operates perfectly coequal with "well-understood" operational methods in 
the invention's field, then it, too, will likely be rendered ineligible. Or, if the 
specification's disclosure is so meaningless that it fails to teach its 
practitioners anything "new or useful" about its field, its overlying patent 
application may fail as well. 
At the same time, these factors are not always present at such extremes. 
There are, to be sure, close cases. And the precise metrics courts should use 
in analyzing these factors is well up to debate. Regarding overly broad claim 
scope, the factors proposed by Lemley, Risch, Sichelman, and Wagner do 
not appear to be an exhaustive list.38t Even those may require a further, 
nuanced explanation.382 Similarly, determining how much the underlying 
invention-as defined in the claims or described in the specification-
overlaps with "well-understood" operational techniques in its field may 
require a detailed understanding of how to assess how an invention's field 
performs research or business. And practically assessing "meaningfulness" of 
the specification's contribution to the art will likely require further parsing 
by the courts. 
But these factors at least provide concrete, legalistic explanations for 
the Supreme Court's patent eligibility jurisprudence; mechanistic 
descriptions of how the actual components of the patent document 
determine patentable subject matter. Like modern understandings of 
complex phenomena in the sciences, decomposition and localization here 
provide insight into how the poorly articulated, confusing, and seemingly 
381. Lemley et ai., supra note 3, at 1341 ("In sum, we believe at least five factors are critical 
to a proper scope-based determination for patentable subject matter eligibility under § 101 .... 
No one factor should dominate; we advocate a contextual, common-law approach. Courts and 
scholars are likely to develop other factors as our approach is applied over time."). 
382. See Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REv. 39, 8g (2008) 
(analogizing the differences in these approaches as tradeoffs between "analytical rigor" and 
"valuable flexibility"); Sichelman, supra note g, at 15-17 (describing some difficulties in 
applying these factors to the technologies at issue in Mayo and Myrialf). 
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contradictory area of patentable subject matter can be explained by 
reference to patents themselves, rather than unrelated discourses into 
scientific philosophy. This is one of the principal strengths-not 
weaknesses-in decomposition and localization in legal analysis: it 
simultaneously roots legal decision-making in concrete identifiable legal 
factors while allowing courts the opportunity to engage in the underlying 
policy levers regarding technological innovation.383 
Whether courts, or rather, another legal institution, should be engaging 
in such explicit policy determinations for patent eligibility-regarded by 
some as simply a threshold test or a "coarse filter" that should be easy to 
apply-is another, higher-order question.384 And given the modern 
development of patent law, whether patent eligibility does any useful work 
apart from its statutory cousins-novelty, nonobviousness, and 
enablement-is another, separate question.385 But there is little simplicity or 
ease in the doctrine as it currently exists, and the Supreme Court has 
recently and explicitly rejected arguments to abandon it.386 Few would argue 
that the Court's repeated invocation of philosophically pregnant terms, like 
"law of nature," rests on firm, principled, legal analysis. An honest 
acknowledgment of how these factors affect patent eligibility, if nothing else, 
frees legal decision makers from grappling with the complexity of natural 
"laws," "phenomena," or "products." 
Applying this mechanistic framework to Mayo and Myriad, the Court's 
two recent patent eligibility cases, one can reach similar, normatively 
desirable outcomes without reference to natural "laws," "phenomena," or 
"products." As recently detailed by Sichelman, the first function, claim 
383. See Burk Be Lemley, supra note 246, at 1642-58 (describing patentable subject matter 
through "policy levers" rather than legal formalism); Lemley et aI., supra note 3, at 1327 ("Lack 
of rigidity is not inherently bad; we suggest a flexible, factors-based test ourselves. But because 
gatekeeping rules attempt to draw conceptual lines around classes of technology with unclear 
boundaries-instead of using the policy-based factors that should drive patentable subject 
matter determinations-the result is a set of tests that overexclude and underexclude in a costly 
and haphazard way."). 
384. Compare, e.g., Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever far Patent Scope, 19 MICH. 
TELECOMM. Be TECH. L. REv. 43, 6(H>I (2012) (arguing that courts should engage in explicit 
policy determinations for patent eligibility), and Lemley et a1., supra note 3, at 1327 (same), and 
Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 
COLUM. L. REv. 1035, 1040-41 (2003) (arguing that both courts and the PTO should), with 
Mary Mitchell Be Dana A. Remus, Interstitial Exclusivities After Association for Molecular 
Pathology, 109 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 34, 39 (2010) (arguing that only Congress 
should), and Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference far the 
PTO, 54 WM. Be MARYL. REv. 1959,2008-12 (2013) (arguing that the PTO, rather than the 
Federal Circuit, should). 
385. Risch, supra note 3, at 591-92 (advocating for the elimination of patent eligibility by 
using other areas of the patent statute). 
386. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012) 
(rejecting the government's arguments to abandon patent eligibility in light of patent law's 
evolution) . 
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breadth, likely weighs heavily against the validity of the claims at issue in 
Myriad but would appear to allow them in Mayo.387 In Myriad, the scope of 
the claim likely prohibited a great deal of follow-on innovation and 
encompassed a number of practical applications for the gene, only some of 
which were disclosed in the specification.388 In addition, the invention-a 
discrete application of information in a rapidly advancing field-was 
potentially the subject of significant improvement by future researchers.389 
Indeed, since the Myriad patents on BRCAr and BRCA2 were filed in 1998, 
genetic sequencing technologies have completely revolutionized.39° In Mayo, 
however, the claims were relatively narrow and likely did not hinder follow-
on innovation.39' Rather, they appeared more like incremental 
improvements, with few applications, in an otherwise cumulatively 
developing field.39" Since the Prometheus Laboratories patents were filed in 
1998, there has been little improvement in honing the appropriate dosage 
of thiopurine drugs to treat Crohn's and inflammatory bowel disease.393 
The second function-distinguishing the claims and specification from 
the prior art-would seem to counsel against the validity of both the Mayo 
and Myriad patents. Both were directed to core operational· techniques in 
their respective fields-drug dosing in Mayo and sequencing in Myria~that 
added only an informational component. That is, the operational 
techniques described in the Mayo patents, "administering" the drug, and 
"determining" its metabolite, were well known in the prior art. Indeed, the 
Mayo patents themselves described them as such.394 The only element 
distinguishing the contested claims was the particular dosage threshold 
itself. Similarly, the operational techniques of many of the claims in the 
387. Sichel man, supra note g, at 15-17. 
388. Id. 
389. Id. at 15-16. 
390. See Michael 1. Metzker, Sequencing Technologies-The Next Generation, 11 NATURE 
REVIEWS GENETICS 31, 31 (2010). 
391. Sichelman, supra note 9, at 15. 
392. Id. at 15-16. 
393. See 1. Chouchana et aI., Review Arlicle: The Benefits of Pharmacogenetics fcrr Improving 
Thiopurine Therapy in Inflammatory Bowel Disease, 35 ALIMENTARY PHARMACOLOGY & 
THERAPEUTICS 15,21 (2012) (listing, in a review of recent literature concerning thiopurine 
dosage, remarkably similar range dosage thresholds to those in Prometheus's patents). 
Interestingly, however, a good deal of follow-on innovation concerning thiopurine 
treatment has recently come about using molecular diagnostics-the same technology at issue 
in the Myriad case. See, e.g., id. at 24-27 (discussing testable pharmacogenetic factors 
contributing to thiopurine metabolism). 
394. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 B2 col. 8, II. 37-43 (filed Apr. 8, 1999) ("Previous 
studies suggested that measurement of 6-MP metabolite levels can be used to predict clinical 
efficacy and tolerance to azathioprine or 6-MP. However, it was unknown what concentrations 
of 6-MP metabolites correlated with optimized therapeutic efficacy or with tOXicity." (citations 
omitted». 
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Myriad patents were also well-known to researchers at the time.395 And again, 
the only element distinguishing the contested claims from the known 
operational techniques was the particular sequence itself. The proximity 
between the Mayo and Myriad patents and core operational techniques in 
their fields strongly counsels in favor of finding the contested claims invalid. 
The last function-the meaningfulness of the specification-likely cuts 
the other way, however. Both cases' patents provided not merely sufficient 
but meaningful information concerning their fields. As detailed in the Mayo 
patents, "it was unknown what concentrations of [thiopurine] metabolites 
correlated ·with optimized therapeutic efficacy or with toxicity."396 The 
patents expressly and clearly provided such information: less than 230 
picomoles of thiopurine metabolites per titer of blood indicated a need to 
increase the dosage; greater than 400 picomoles of thiopurine metabolites 
per titer of blood indicated a need to decrease the dosage.397 This 
information was both "new and useful" to practitioners in the field.3g8 
Similarly, the specifications of the Myriad patents were quite meaningful with 
respect to detecting whether a particular patient possessed an increased risk 
for breast cancer. If a patient possessed the sequence variants disclosed in 
the patent specification, their risk for developing breast cancer increased by 
a calculable amount-also disclosed in the patents.399 If a patient did not, 
their risk was presumed to be the same as that found in the general 
population.4OO This type of analysis, applied to breast cancer, was both "new 
and useful" for clinical purposes,401 and counsels against the Court's 
invalidity determination. 
This mechanistic-functional analysis of Mayo and Myriad demonstrates 
the principal benefit to the approach: it compels similar, normatively 
desirable results to those reflected in the Court's opinions without relying 
on philosophical language. The Mayo patents, which prior to the Supreme 
395. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 col. 30, II. 41-46 (filed June 7, 1995) ("Preferred 
embodiments relating to methods for detecting BRCAI or its mutations include enzyme linked 
immunosorbent assays (ELISA), radioimmunoassays (RIA), immunoradiometric assays (IRMA) 
and immunoenzymatic assays (lEMA), including sandwich assays using monoclonal and/or 
polyclonal antibodies."). 
396. '623 B2 Patent col. 8, II. 40-42. 
397. Id. at col. 20, II. 10-25. 
398. See C. Cuffari et aI., Quantitation of 6-Thioguanine in Peripheral Blood Leukocyte DNA in 
Crohn's Disease Patients on Maintenance 6-Mercaptopunne Therapy, 74 CANADIAN]' PHYSIOLO(,'Y & 
PHARMACOLOGY 580, 582 (1996) (discussing the development of "an assay to measure 6TG 
levels in leukocyte DNA"). 
399· '473 Patent passim. 
400. Id. passim. 
401. See Elizabeth B. Claus et aI., Genetic Analysis of Breast Cancer in the Cancer and Steroid 
Hormone Study, 48 AM.]. HUM. GENETICS 232, 232 (1991) (remarking that, at the time, this was 
the largest data set collected to study genetic risk profiles for breast cancer). 
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Court's decision were subject to a nuanced analysis by commentators,40• 
receive an equally nuanced portrait here. Their claims do not appear overly 
broad, nor do their specifications disclose meaningless improvements, but 
their contributions above and beyond core operational techniques for 
diagnostics border on zero. This clearly and strongly factored into the 
Court's opinion in Mayo with its repeated reference to "well-understood, 
routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the 
field"4°3-stronger, perhaps, than concerns regarding the breadth of the 
patents' claims or the meaningfulness of the specifications' contributions. 
The Myriad patents, however, received almost universal censure from 
commentators and scientists alike.404 Accordingly, the mechanistic analysis 
presented here condemns those patents under both the claim-breadth and 
prior-art demarcating functions. In this way, patent eligibility can replace 
attempts to define natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products" with the 
sort of legal analysis courts are typically tasked to do. Without it, it would 
seem, patent eligibility may remain needlessly complex. 
CONCLUSION 
Patent law's traditional concern over patents on "principles" or 
"abstractions" has been replaced with incantations against "laws of nature," 
"natural phenomena," and "products of nature." These words, however, are 
meaningless as both legal terms of art and as scientific concepts. Since their 
adoption, the Supreme Court has provided no framework or set of factors to 
assess whether a patent's claims come within those terms' ambit. And worse 
yet, a branch of scientific philosophy, known as natural complexity, stresses 
the cognitive difficulties imposed on crafting general rules about a multi-
elemental, multi-variable, interconnected concept of Nature. The Court's 
continued reliance on this legally and scientifically meaningless terminology 
explains some of the difficulties the doctrine of patent eligibility suffers from 
today, including falsely equating all natural concepts as unpatentable "laws" 
or "phenomena," marginalizing claim language, and effecting an anti-
biotechnology bias. 
Today, after years of doctrinal accretion, patent eligibility has itself 
become complex. Consequently, distilling patent eligibility into a simple 
402. See Lemley et al., supra note 3, at 1344 ("[T]he claim was to very specific 
measurements of a particular drug. Like Metabolite, Pmmetheus involves an application of the 
natural principles discovered by the patentee. It is not generative, nor will it unduly bar future 
inventors. If, however, this claim were expanded to cover all drugs without any specific 
measurements, then it would be an abstract idea."). 
403. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). 
404- See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews & Jordan Paradise, Gene Patents: The Need for Bioethies Scrutiny 
and Legal Change, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 403, 404 (2005) (criticizing Myriad's 
patents on public health grounds); Aaron S. Kesselheim et ai., Gene Patenting-The Suprli'YM Court 
Finally Speaks, 369 NEW ENG.]. MED. 869 (2013) (same for research preemption purposes). 
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formula-without doing significant, and politically untenable harm to the 
Supreme Court's patent jurisprudence-remains challenging. Complexity 
theorists, however, have recognized twin strategies to developing 
"mechanistic" descriptions of complex phenomena: "decomposition," 
breaking a system down into cognitively simple subparts, and "localization," 
mapping the functions of those subparts to the system as a whole. While this 
may appear inapplicable to the law, many other complex areas of 
jurisprudence use this methodology by breaking down high-order, 
generalized questions into separate "factors" or "prongs" that map to the 
law's substantive purposes. Patent eligibility could be similarly simplified by 
decomposing the inquiry into assessing how the functions of each 
component part of the patent document-the claims and the 
specification-localize to patent eligibility's policy goals. In particular, courts 
should consider the scope of the patent's claims, the claims' and the 
specification's relationship to the prior art, and whether the specification 
provides a meaningful-not merely sufficient-disclosure of a "new and 
useful" technology. This analysis has several advantages to the current state 
of affairs: it frees patent eligibility from its focus on scientifically meaningless 
terms; it is likely to be politically palatable to both the Supreme Court and 
Congress; and it does not readily suffer from some of the difficulties patent 
eligibility currently poses on patent law, generally. Such a test, regardless as 
to how it is ultimately crafted, is unlikely to be without its own uncertainties. 
But without decomposition and localization, patent eligibility will likely 
remain needlessly complex. 
